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The world’s sea transport is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
Through its regulatory framework, the IMO “prescribes responsibilities to governments, 
shipping companies, shipboard personnel, and port/port facility personnel to deter security 
threats and take preventative measures against security incidents affecting ships or port 
facilities used in international trade” (IMO, 2016) as set out by its member states. While the 
IMO prescribes responsibilities, as contained in the regulatory framework, on preventative 
measures against security threats, it does not provide guidelines on how these preventive 
measures are supposed to be done. As a result, the responsibility on determining what 
preventative measures are to be undertaken remains with each member of the shipping 
community state to decide on the solution.  
 
Like many IMO members, South Africa does not have a national maritime security strategy. 
Accordingly, a need for South Africa to develop its own national maritime security strategy 
over and above the regional maritime security strategy has been identified. Part of the argument 
for developing a national maritime security strategy is informed by the need to close the gap 
left by the absence of such a strategy in the national security framework of the country. 
Currently, South Africa’s maritime security environment is fragmented with a number of 
stakeholders’ such as the Department of Transport (DOT), Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA), South African Revenue Service (SARS), South African Police Service (SAPS), State 
Security Agency (SSA), South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA), South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF), Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), Transnet Ports 
Terminal (TPT), Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and Department of Fisheries 
and Forestry (DAFF) constitutionally mandated with different maritime security mandates 
within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). There is, however, a consensus amongst 
all these stakeholders that some of the challenges existing within the South African maritime 
environment require a national maritime security strategy. Without a national maritime security 
strategy, views on South Africa’s state of readiness to address maritime security challenges are 
split. Accordingly, a clear constitutional mandate appointing a lead department is necessary. 
 
In addition to concluding that South Africa needs to develop a codified national security policy, 
this study further found that such a codified national security policy should aim at specifically 
addressing fragmentation in all national security areas and that such a codified national security 
policy must constitute specific modules reflective of each area of national security with clear 
directions on who takes the overall responsibility when it comes to control and command. In 
order to attain a comprehensive view, the research recommended further research on the pre-
drafting process of the strategy and its implementation.    
 
KEY WORDS: Maritime security, national security, maritime strategy, national security 
policy, and national maritime security strategy.  
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Maritime safety and security has been a matter of concern for maritime nations around the 
world due to the need for the protection of their national maritime interests. Not only does 
maritime safety and security a matter of concern to individual maritime nations, it is also a 
matter of collective concern to countries whose trade relationships are linked through sea 
transport. It is partly due to the collective concern for maritime safety and security that maritime 
nations have seen the need for a collective strategy on maritime security. According to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the development of international regulations has 
“always” been perceived as “the best way of improving safety at sea” (IMO, 2017). While a 
number of bilateral treaties were adopted to address maritime safety and security across 
national boundaries, it was only after the formation of the United Nations that an international 
regulatory body, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization was founded as 
a unit of the United Nations (IMO, 2017). The name Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization was changed to the International Maritime Organization in 1982 
(IMO, 2017). 
The purpose of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is to promote safe, secure, 
environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through adoption of the highest 
practicable standards of maritime safety and security (IMO, 2017). IMO intend to accomplish 
these goals through cooperation with its member’s states as stated in its Convention which 
came into operation in 1959 (IMO, 2017). In terms of Article 1 (a) of the IMO, the purposes of 
the Organisation are “to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field 
of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting 
shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the 
highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation 
and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships” (IMO, 2017, p. 1). Part B of the 
code states that it is the responsibility of government to develop a co-ordination maritime 
security mechanisms, such as a national maritime security framework/strategy. 
Because of its focus on shipping engaged in international trade, the IMO has limitations when 
it comes to national maritime security issues. The IMO’s International Ports Facilities and 
Security (ISPS) Code “prescribes responsibilities to governments, shipping companies, 
shipboard personnel, and port/port facility personnel to deter security threats and take 
preventative measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in 
international trade (IMO, 2016)”. The prescribed responsibilities of governments are intended 
to be carried out through the instrumentality of governmental regulation and practices but it is 
not specific about how such governments should implement their national maritime security 
agendas.    
South Africa is a member of the IMO and therefore bound by the stipulations of the 
prescriptions. This study was intended to evaluate whether South Africa requires a national 
maritime security governance framework, in a form of a national maritime security strategy in 
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line with the ISPS Code. This document presents the outcome of the said study that was 
conducted in a South African environment, amongst identified relevant maritime security 
stakeholders. Specifically, the research was intended to answer the research question “To what 
extent is South Africa in need of a comprehensive national maritime security strategy?” The 
study further assessed the views, feelings and ideologies of its participants in relation to current 
challenges facing maritime security in South Africa. Suggested solutions and propositions to 
stakeholders have been made.  
The researcher considered the defined maritime security, national security and maritime 
strategy in order to lay a foundation for understanding what the phenomenon constitute. 
Accordingly, the study evaluated current maritime security arrangement, roles and 
responsibilities of relevant maritime security stakeholders and their legal mandates taking into 
account the regional, continental and international implications as well as adherence to the IMO 
guidelines. It is intended that this study will foster further discussions on the phenomenon of 
maritime safety and security paying more attention to evaluating whether South Africa is ready 
and has the capability to respond to maritime security issues that might emerge within its 
territorial waters.     
 This report is divided into detailed chapters with each chapter providing a perspective and 
discussion about the study. The first chapter provides a background to the study by detailing 
the historic overview of maritime insecurity in South Africa. 
 
 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The start of maritime insecurity in South Africa 
 
The issue of maritime insecurity in South Africa dates back to the arrival of Jan Van Riebeek 
in the Cape of Good Hope in the year 1652  (South African History on line, 2016). Jan Van 
Riebeeck and his men identified the Cape of Good Hope as strategically well positioned for 
establishing a base station to supply ships with fresh fruits, vegetables, water and medication 
as well as being a vital point of maritime communication due to its geographic location which 
is halfway to the East (Potgieter & Grundlingh, 2007). However, with Jan Van Riebeek’s initial 
intentions come maritime threats which gave birth to maritime insecurity. What is today known 
as human trafficking was in fact slavery and forced labour at the time. Sailors were abducting 
people along the route to work onboard ships as slaves.  As slave trading was illegal in the 
Netherlands where Jan Van Riebeek came from, these sailors stopped at the Cape of Good 
Hope and sold their slaves on their last voyage en route to the Netherlands (South African 
History online, 2011). 
 
In addition to introducing human trafficking, maritime insecurity also brought territorial wars 
and power struggle between the British and the Dutch through what is known in history as the 
Anglo-Dutch wars (South African History online, 2011). The strategic positioning of the Cape 
of Good Hope made it a sought after location by each foreign nation for its own benefit. The 
ensuing naval wars continued till late 1815 when different areas in Africa were colonised. 
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Historically the invasion by the British demonstrated none existence of maritime security in 
the Cape of Good Hope in those times. Given the lack of land-based resistance, the foreigners 
arrived in the country by sea with ease. The invaders used the land used by Khoikhoi and the 
San people to farm and they denied the Khoikhoi and the San the rights and title to the land 
(South African History online, 2011). 
 
Protection of South Africa’s maritime interest: Historical overview  
 
The British settlers captured the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch in 1795 through their 
naval power (Potgieter & Grundlingh, 2007). The capitulation of the Cape of Good Hope 
imposed a foreign naval power which eventually overtook the rest of the country leading to 
South Africa getting under the umbrella of the British rule for decades. It was only in the year 
1922 that the South African Navy was created to replace British Royal Navy (Potgieter, 2004). 
According to Potgieter (2004), even though the British Royal Navy assisted South Africa to 
establish its own “South African Navy”, Britain still maintained a strong presence in South 
Africa in order to protect its interests including the Cape Sea Route. It was in 1955 that the 
South African Navy took over Simons Town Naval Base from the British following the signing 
of "Simon's Town Agreement" (Potgieter, 2004). While the signing of the agreement accorded 
the South African Navy wider operational responsibilities, the Britain Royal Navy continued 
to enjoy the privilege of using the base and its facilities (Potgieter, 2004). This arrangement 
ended in June 1975 when the naval base came under the exclusive use of the South African 
Navy (Potgieter, 2004).       
In 1990 the Marine Branch of the South African Navy was disbanded, the disbanding of the 
Marine Branch of the South African Navy resulted in the loss of South Africa’s marine 
capability (Manganyi, 2012). With the disbanding of the Marine Branch of the South African 
Navy, South Africa also stopped the acquisition of new ships (Manganyi, 2012).  
There is a major difference of approach to regional issues and international co-operation of 
apartheid South Africa and post-apartheid South Africa. Although South Africa was a founding 
member of the United Nations in 1945, the country was preventing from participating in the 
activities of the organisation due to international opposition to apartheid. Kok (2015) states that 
although apartheid era South Africa sought to destabilise its neighbours, post-apartheid South 
Africa subsequently became an important role player in peace and security development in 
Africa. Manganyi (2012) points out that shortly after South Africa’s readmittance into the 
international community, the South African navy participated in regional peace-keeping 
missions. Walker (2015) suggests that it seems as if there is a surge of patriotism when it comes 
to the commitment of South African government in peace building missions.   
In spite of its regional commitment, post-apartheid South Africa has always wanted to have a 
maritime capability but seem not to have had the political will to support and provide the 
necessary resources to sustain it (Manganyi, 2012). Internal political differences served as a 
hindrance for building a naval capability for South Africa. Through the Strategic Arms Package 
(SAP), commonly known as the “Arms Deal”, a number of weapon systems, which included 
naval ships, submarines, helicopters and aircrafts were procured (Holden & van Vuuren, 2017). 
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Sylvester & Seegers (2008) suggest that this had largely drawn public controversy during the 
post-apartheid era. It was stated that the original price for SAP was R29.9 billion. This excluded 
finance charges, escalations and foreign exchange rates as the cost was to be paid over a period 
of time (Sylvester & Seegers, 2008). According to the calculations made by Sylvester & 
Seegers (2008), the total cost of SAP was standing at R90 billion in 2008.  Newham (2013) 
suggests that the cost of SAP seem to make South African military leaders uncomfortable to 
talk about military acquisitions as this might resuscitate suspicions that some politicians may 
receive kickbacks from such acquisitions as had been alleged with the arms deal saga 
(Newham, 2013). Sylvester & Seegers, 2008) suggest that the controversy around the “Arms 
Deal” created the need for future policy decisions to be undertaken in an ethical manner to 
prevent another arms deal saga. Given the reluctance to equip South Africa’s armed forces 
following the arms deal saga, it is unclear whether the South African navy has sufficient 
resources to protect the interests of the country.  
The development of blue economy and maritime security 
 
In terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (1982) the 
sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters. According 
to UNCLOS (1982), this territory extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to 
its bed and subsoil. Article 16 of UNCLOS (1982) further states that the Coastal State shall 
determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its waters. Article 55 of UNCLOS 
defines an Exclusive Economic Zone as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the 
relevant provisions of this Convention (UNCLOS, 1982, p. 43).  
 
It is against this background that South Africa took interest to exploit its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) for the economic benefit of the country (Operation Phakisa, 2015). In 1994, the 
South African Maritime Zones Act (15 of 1994) was enacted to “provide for the maritime zones 
of the Republic; and to provide for matters connected therewith” (p. 3). The act makes 
provision for a detailed definition of South Africa’s territorial waters. Despite the Act, it does 
not seem that South Africa had fully exploited the provisions of the Maritime Zones Act (15 
of 1994). During his 2014 State of the Nation address in which he announced governments 
National Development Plan programme for unlocking the economic potential of South Africa’s 
oceans, South Africa’s President Zuma stated that South Africa had not yet exploited its 
geographic location, infrastructure and skills to accelerate growth. The President launched 
Operation Phakisa which had four pillars under its ocean economy. These pillars were 
aquaculture, offshore oil and gas, marine protection and governance and maritime transport 
and manufacturing (DPME, 2017). The government projected that South African waters had 
the potential to add growth of over US$14. 47 billion to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
close to one million additional jobs, up to approximately US$4.58 billion contribution to GDP 
and 316 000 jobs to be created (Jernberg, 2015). South Africa is ideally positioned to service 
the East-West cargo traffic and the booming economy of the African offshore oil gas industry 
(DPME, 2017).  
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Perception of current maritime security threats and incidents  
 
The researcher further looked at different government maritime security stakeholders in order 
to understand their roles and responsibilities in protecting the country’s territorial sea against 
maritime threats. A number of authours have defined what these threats, which Jernberg (2015) 
argues are transnational, are. The following authours extrapolate what the maritime threats are:  
 
 
Table 1: Definitions of maritime threats 
 
Author Threats 
Mokoena, (2013) refers to maritime threats as human trafficking, illegal exploitation 
of maritime resources like illegal and unregulated fishing, 
environmental violations, terrorism…piracy; 
 
Fouche, (2015) talks about illegal fishing, people smuggling, arms smuggling, 
piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking; 
 
Coelho, (2013) who slightly proved a different perspective on possibilities of inter-
state conflict, jeopardised economies and environment and public 
health; 
 
Walker, (2015) Piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking and smuggling of 
drugs, people and arms, as well as related money laundering” and 
 
Potgieter, (2013) who refers to “Maritime terrorism, fishing infringements, illegal 
smuggling, and trafficking (drugs, arms and humans)”   
 
 
These threats are not country specific and therefore different threats may be applicable to 
different countries dependent on the dynamics of each country. In reference to the above, piracy 
and armed robbery have been identified by most writers as stated above. However, the 
International Maritime Bureau Report (2017) published by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) has recorded recent incidents of piracy and armed robbery that has occurred 
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Table 2: Incidents of International Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Country Date Ship type Nature of incident 
India 17 Feb  2017 Offshore support 
vessel  
Two robbers boarded the vessel and stole 
ship’s equipment and escaped.  
Nigeria  08 Mar  2017 Bulk Carrier  Seven persons armed with guns approached 
the vessel and fired with guns, on noticing that 
the vessel increased speed  
Singapore  05 Jan 2017 Chemical Tanker  A tanker underway was chased by a speed 
boat. 
Philippines  05 Mar 2017 General Cargo  A skiff with around six person on-board  
chanced a vessel and the master raised speed 
and raised the alarm 
Nigeria  05 Feb 2017 General Cargo  Armed pirates attacked and boarded the ship, 
kidnapped eight crew members and escaped.  
Congo  09 Feb 2017 Supply vessel  Robbers stole ship’s properties  
Indonesia  23 Feb 2017 Offshore Tug Five robbers armed with a knife boarded an 
anchored offshore tug  
  
Source: The ICC International Maritime Bureau report, (2017) 
 
The absence of South Africa’s mention in this report raises a question of whether piracy and 
armed robbery of ships is a real threat to South African waters. Illegal fishing seems to be more 
of a threat in South Africa territorial waters. The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries on the 12 May 2016 spotted nine vessels suspected of illegal fishing around Durban, 
Port Saint Johns and Cape Recife, all within South Africa’s Exclusive Economic Zone (DAFF, 
2016). According to the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, only one of the 
vessels was successfully escorted to the port of Saldana Bay for proper inspection. The other 
vessels escaped during the night (DAFF, 2016). While the report by the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries indicates an existing threat of illegal fishing for South 
Africa, it is unclear how many illegal fishing vessels go undetected. It is equally unclear how 
many other threats go undetected due to lack of infrastructure to detect any crimes committed 
on the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone. This suggests the need to define the country’s 
maritime security threats in order to align any national security strategy. 
 
South Africa is not only exposed to maritime security threats due to its geographic location, 
the country gets exposed due to the types of ships that visit South African ports and ports 
facilities. People travel from other countries in the continent to South Africa with the intention 
of stowing away from South African ports through international ships destined for America or 
Europe, exposing South Africa to threats associated with stowaways and trespassing. South 
Africa was reported to be amongst the top ten countries in Africa to have high stowaway 
incident by Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I Club) (IMO, 2013). It was also found 
that none of the stowaways reported being picked up by ships in South Africa where actual 
South African nationals. Accordingly stowaways are a realistic maritime security threat 
affecting South Africa. 
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There is no doubt that South Africa is a maritime nation with its own potentials and challenges, 
and that it has always been so. Historically maritime insecurity existed, economic potential also 
existed and maritime threat existed. However, South Africa has not clearly defined its maritime 
threats and its need for protection. The country moved from historical hindrance of maritime 
security to regional support and jumped straight to identification of the blue economy. 
Therefore, now seems an opportune time to determine South Africa’s ability to protect its 
maritime interest. Hence, the paper is evaluating a need for a collaborative national maritime 




The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) provides guidelines to member states for 
developing their national maritime security strategies/frameworks in order to coordinate the 
activities of all their maritime security stakeholders in order deter security threats and take 
preventative measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in 
international trade (IMO, 2012). 
The current governance system of national maritime security in South Africa is fragmented 
with maritime security stakeholders working in isolation. In stating that “the security service 
of the Republic consist of a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence 
service” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 21) seems to encourage 
the different security services of the country to work in isolation. The Constitution further states 
that “all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must exercise their 
power and exercise the functions in the manner that does not encroach on the geographical, 
functional of the other” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 21). 
Accordingly, this makes it difficult for these stakeholders to work together on a common 
objective, jointly supporting and collaborating with each other and sharing resources. 
Therefore, scarce resources are not maximised because each stakeholder is responsible for their 
own resources and have different national priorities and no jurisdiction over the other. What 
this suggests is that the Department of Transport as the regulating body for national maritime 
security issues, cannot command the South African Navy or South African Police Service to 
prioritise issues pertaining to commercial shipping security threats.        
PURPOSE STATEMENT  
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent to which South Africa requires a national 
maritime security strategy, and how such a strategy should be developed. The study seeks to 
understand the current maritime security arrangement in terms of the roles and responsibilities 
of maritime security stakeholders and their challenges. The insight that will emerge from this 
study will contribute to discussions amongst the relevant maritime security stakeholders on the 
possibility of establishing a national maritime security strategy and whether such a strategy is 
required or not, and which system of governance should be applied under which ministry.   
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The study examines whether and to what extent South Africa needs a national maritime security 
strategy to govern the maritime security domain. The study attempts to find answers to the 
following questions:  
 
Main Research Question  
 
a.  To what extent is South Africa in need of a comprehensive national maritime security 




a. How is the current South African maritime security arrangement and what are its 
challenges? 
b. How should the South African national maritime security strategy be governed?    
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
The phenomena of maritime security is not a new field of study and has been researched quite 
widely. Examples of studies conducted include Coelho, (2013) “Southern African maritime 
security: Problems and prospects”; Baker, (2012) “The South African navy African maritime 
security”; and Potgieter, (2013) “Regional Leadership and Maritime security. However, a study 
specific to the co-operative coordination arrangement on national maritime security strategy is 
proposed as another phenomenon in South Africa due to the absence of an existing South 
African national maritime security strategy. Given the current initiative by the President of the 
country on Operation Phakisa which intends to unlock the economic potential of South Africa’s 
oceans, the findings of this study might serve as a ‘sounding board’ for this initiative. The 
report will suggest best practise and identify further research work that needs to be conducted 
in this regard.    
 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS  
 
This research report is divided into various chapters outlining the flow of the report from start 
to end. Chapter one begins by providing an introduction to the study, details the background 
to the study, the problem and purpose statement, the research question and limitation of the 
study.  
 
Chapter two present literature reviewed in the study, the chapter documented the formation of 
the conceptual framework and the research gap identified. The chapter reviewed literature on 
maritime security and various discussions on the phenomenon. These findings are presented in 
Chapter four of this report which explores the current maritime security arrangement and 
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conducts a comparative discussion of other national maritime security strategies from other 
countries.   
 
Chapter three provides the research methodology which details the research approach and 
design, data collection, data analyses and data presentation. The process was used to arrive at 
the findings set in the report and also advices on the instruments used by the researcher in order 
to ascertain reliability and validity of the findings. 
 
Chapter four of the study presents the research findings. The said chapter presents data 
collected through interviews with different maritime security stakeholders. Structured 
interviews were conducted with identified participant.  
 
Chapter five provide the research findings and analyses, the said chapter seeks to justify the 
voice of the researcher, the voice of interviews and the voice of literature.  
 
The final chapter (Chapter six), puts together the discussion of the report into a summary and 
recommendation. The chapter details the knowledge gap and propose future research areas for 
consideration and topics for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   
The literature review process evaluated the currently debates on the phenomenon, how the 
phenomenon is defined, the views of writers and what is defined as current challenges. The 
purpose of the literature review was to assess current discussions on whether South Africa 
requires a national maritime security strategy.  
 
Coelho, (2014) argues that the argument on maritime security is not very clear due to the fact 
that it is not possible to demarcate boundaries at sea, state. He refers to the sea as stranger than 
land and that until the 17th century, many countries had attempted to demarcate boundaries at 
sea without success when a declaration was made that the sea should be used by all. “Hence, 
the perspective, which exist today, of the sea as a common space that everyone could benefit 
from” stated Coelho, (2014, p. 124). 
  
The said scenario motivated this research which was aimed at evaluating South Africa’s 
position in the maritime environment focusing on the protection of the country against any 
threats that may emanate from the sea. To begin the study, a conceptual evaluation on maritime 
security was conducted.  
 
DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES  
 
The formulation of the concept national maritime security strategy can be fragmented into 
pieces in order to gain meaning to individual terminologies. These terminologies are "national", 
"maritime", "security" and "strategy". However, for the purpose of the study, these 
terminologies were matched into two's. As such three concepts were selected as, maritime 
security, national security and maritime strategy. These three concepts when combined 
formulate "national maritime security strategy". The illustration below demonstrates the said 
formation. 
 
    
National Maritime Security Strategy
Maritime Security National Security Maritime Security Strategy
 
  
Figure 1: Illustration of a national maritime security strategy formulation 




What is security? 
  
This study is conducted under the philosophy of security and maritime. As security is central 
to this research, it is therefore to define the term security. Hutchful, (2008) argues that to 
appropriately define security, it is necessary to understand who or what is to be protected? Who 
is the protector? What do we seek protection from and at what cost? Who defines what is 
constituted as a security threat? Hutchful’s (2008)  argument suggests that defining the term 
security will require more than just scholarly definition but  situation analyses is also required 
in order to get an appropriately contextualised definition.  
 
Balwin, (1999) seems to agree with Hutchful’s (2008) and elaborates more by stating that the 
following questions are need to be answered in order to define security appropriately.  
 
o Security for whom? This question requires that the writer specifies the referent object that 
needs security protection. This could be stated at individual or individuals, state or states 
and international. The choice will depend on the research question that needs to be 
addressed; 
o Security for which value? The inclusion of a subjective and objective dimension of value 
is required as failure to include value might result in confusion. The stated dimension of 
value might be physical, economic welfare, economic relations and so forth;  
o How much security? The degree of protection needs to be specified to determine how much 
is enough security. In the competition of objectives for scarce resources, such a degree must 
be defined; 
o For what threat? Speciality and profession become relevant in defining the exact threat the 
system needs to be directed to; 
o By what means? Reference is made to instruments such a policy, legal framework and other 
resources that might be needed to achieve the objective;  
o At what cost? Specification of the financial implication is important due to competition for 
scarce resources; and  
o In what time period? A stipulation in terms of the long-term and short-term objectives.  
 
 Hermann (2005) is of the view that security is “the protective condition which statesmen either 
try to acquire, or perceive, in order to guard the various components of their polities form both 
external and internal threats” (p. 19). The definition does not clearly indicate what security is. 
It refers to a “condition” but is not specific about what condition.        
 
What is maritime security? 
 
Garcia, (2014) refers to the term “maritime” as an adjective that refers to the sea. The word 
(maritime) is used to modify a noun in order to give meaning. As such the word “maritime” is 
used in different ways including maritime environment, maritime safety, marine pollution or 
maritime policy. ”Maritime” also refers to activities happening at sea, such as seaborne trade 
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(Wikipedia, 2016). Accordingly, the term “maritime” does not possess any specific meaning 
without a noun added to it to give a complete meaning. Perhaps joining the concept security 
within the term maritime will provide a clear distinct meaning to the phenomenon.  
 
This study reviewed literature on the definition of maritime security. Feldt et al., 2013) note 
that the concept of maritime security has no universal legal or agreed definition due to the fact 
that the topic is broad, covering many policy aspects. Accordingly, there was no consensus on 
the definition of "maritime security” which is abbreviated as MARSEC. Bueger (2015) 
suggests that maritime security is perceived as the latest “buzzword” as its power emanates 
from a vague euphemistic quality and ability to embrace a multitude of possible meanings. 
Bueger (2015) further argues that the multiplicity of meanings associated with maritime 
security is also a function of the context in which different writers discuss the concept. 
Accordingly, its meaning varies across its actors (Bueger, 2015). Maritime security is said to 
be a responsibility of government although it does not have a clear definition when it comes to 
maritime security operations.  Feldt et al. (2013) note that the authority to act on behalf of the 
state is said to be a sovereign prerogative.  
 
Bueger (2015) suggests that some writers associate the issue of maritime security with four 
security matrices; marine environment; national security; human security; and economic 
development. Thisapproach appears to be followed by a number of writers such as the United 
Kingdom (2014), which defines the concept of maritime security as "the advancement and 
protection of the UK's national interest at home and abroad, through the active management of 
risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the 
UK's prosperity, security and resilience to help and shape the world". The national interest they 
refer to could be related to the marine environment or economic development or both. This 
definition provides a broad view of the maritime security. Accordingly, the definition continues 
to provide no clear demarcation of the environment in the definition. Referring to the French 
(2015) definition in its National Maritime Security Strategy, that maritime security is the 
prevention and fighting off all international activities which are hostile to their interest, 
McGowan et al., (2006) suggest that this definition demonstrates the theory of realism which 
reflects that "states are selfish actors who always seek to maximise their own interest, even at 
the cost of risking the benefits that more than one state can share”. 
The literature on the definition of maritime security concludes that there is no consensus on the 
definition of the concept maritime security. In general, it is defined as a combination of 
preventive and responsive measures aimed at both law enforcement as well as civilian military 
requirements (Sarkesien et al., 2008). The argument by Sarkesien et al. (2008) harmonises the 
understanding that the concept of security or maritime security requires a contextualised 
situational analysis in order to get a more uniform definition.  In addition to defining security, 
it is equally important to get more clarity on what is meant by national security of a state.  




What is national security?   
 
Although national security interest may vary from country to country, in many countries, the 
responsibility for national security is constitutionally mandated to the military and the law 
enforcement apparatus of the state.  Sarkesien et al. (2008) refers to two dimensions that might 
be reflective in the national security definition that is the physical and psychological security 
measures. Physical security referring to the military capacity to successfully protect the state 
against any external threats, and psychologically reflecting opinion and attitude of its citizens, 
people’s willingness to support government efforts to achieve national security (Sarkesien et 
al. (2008).  Sarkesien et al. (2008) further point out that these debates may vary depending on 
the nature and the size of the gap between policy definition and strategy. Edmonds (1988) adds 
that these debates might be related to the historical definition of the military, the reflection of 
violence or physical coercion by states, society or a group against another to achieve its desired 
objective. Garcia (2004) suggests that it is important to acknowledge the interdependency of 
the military, environment, economic, social and political issues when defining national 
security.   
What is a maritime strategy?   
 
Hattendorf (2013) defines maritime strategy as “the direction of all aspects of national power 
that relates to a nation’s interests at sea”. It is, however, important to point out that in a case of 
landlocked countries; maritime security might not be a national priority even though such 
countries may conduct maritime trade with neighbouring states. Hattendorf’s (2013) begins his 
argument by stating that the definition of a maritime strategy has its own complexity and that 
there are no absolute dicta on the definition. According to Hattendorf (2013), such complexities 
could be related to the fact that the definitions were made during different times, different 
outlooks, different problems, different mind-sets, different capabilities, different decision-
making and different technologies. Talyer (2008) points out that, historically, the focus of 
maritime strategy was to control the sea, what was referred to as “sea power”. However, the 
new maritime strategies recognise that when it is safe and free for all, the economic benefits of 
the sea benefit all nations.  
The Maritime strategy is a process that brings means and ends together and knowing how to 
act and with what resources to use in order to achieve policy goals. Maritime strategy also 
looks at the overall plan of guarding the overall maritime environment including the economic 
interests of the state. Garcia (2014) indicates that the phenomenon of globalisation has resulted 
in the inability of one state to control the sea. Accordingly, the twentieth-century style of 
national security strategies aims to concentrate a wide range of policy-making. Accordingly, 
the maritime strategy should device operational plans that are consistent with the legitimate 
ends of a political community (Garcia, 2014). Snider (1995) suggests allocating joint resources 
in creating both long- term and short- term instruments. Snider (1995) adds that the "art of 
devising and articulating strategy are that of combining the various elements of power and 
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relating them to the desired end". It is of importance for the study to define the application of 
the concepts in the study, the above-mentioned definitions suggests that “security” and 
“maritime” cannot be meaningfully defined in isolation. A situational analyses is required to 
get context-specific meaning of maritime security. However, a South African situational 
definition of maritime security strategy is important for this research, hence the research will 
discuss South African situational analysis.   
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE  
 
The world’s sea transportation is regulated through the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) which gets its mandate from its member states to ensure an international regulatory 
framework that is applicable to all shipping communities. The International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) was established by the United Nation’s international conference held in 
Geneva in 1948 and entered into force in 1958 (IMO, 2016). The main mandate of the 
organisation is to promote and support "safe, secure, environmentally sound, efficient and 
sustainable shipping through cooperation" (IMO, 2016). This objective is achieved through the 
adoption of practical standards of maritime safety and security (IMO, 2016). The IMO has 
adopted the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which was hailed as 
the most important treaty of the IMO (IMO, 2016). The purpose of SOLAS (1974) is to “ensure 
that ships flagged by member states comply with minimum safety standards in construction, 
equipment and operations” (SOLAS, 1974). 
 
The IMO (2016) indicates that the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro 
marked one of the first significant acts of maritime terrorism. In response to this, the IMO 
adopted a Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
navigation (SUA) in 1988. The convention provides a legal framework for actions to be taken 
against persons committing unlawful acts against ships (IMO, 2016). In 2004 Chapter XI-2 of 
the IMO’s SOLAS convention was amended to capture the implementation of the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (IMO, 2012). The ISPS Code prescribes 
responsibilities to governments, shipping companies, shipboard personnel, and port/port 
facility personnel to deter security threats and take preventative measures against security 
incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade (IMO, 2016). The 
objectives of the ISPS Code include the establishment of an international framework that 
fosters cooperation between Contracting Government agencies, local administrations and the 
shipping and port industries, in assessing and detecting potential security threats to ships or 
port facilities used for international trade, so as to implement preventative security measures 
against such threats (IMO, 2012). 
 
The work of the IMO continued over the years and the organisation continued providing 
guidelines and support to its members stated, most particularly anti-piracy and armed robberies 
of ships, best management practices and recently carriage of arms on board ship (IMO, 2016). 
Other initiatives includes cyber security, counter-terrorism, stowaways, drugs smuggling and 
capacity building (IMO, 2016). South Africa became a member state (contracting 
governments) of the IMO in 1995 forming part of the 172 member countries. These countries 
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agreed to cooperate through governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters 
of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade (IMO, 2016). South Africa as a 
contracting Government of the IMO was required to designate a national contact point for 
international maritime obligations. South Africa designated the Department of Transport 
(DOT) as the “Designated Authority”. This meant that DOT was mandated with ensuring that 
the work of the IMO was ratified nationally and that legal binding treaties were implemented. 
Nationally, the DoT is tasked with a mandate of ensuring that South Africa becomes compliant 
with all legal binding agreements, which includes security of the sea. The challenge becomes 
whether DoT has power of authority to other state departments. Is internal resources available 
to assist the department to deliver on this mandate? The current South African legislation 
(Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951) is very old, the act was enacted in 1951 making it older 
than most IMO treaties.     
 
The influence of the Great Power 
 
International structures and obligations have a direct influence on national maritime security 
policy formulation and strategies. The application of these laws can never be one size fits all, 
particularly in the African continent. It is essential that states define their own maritime domain 
in line with UNCLOS, whether such a move will benefit African states or not, it still remains 
their responsibility to define their own interests. South Africa has defined and claimed its 
maritime zone, as discussed in this report, however, the definition was influenced by the 
country’s geographic location and in line with the international legal framework. The 
international law regulates the sea, on the other hand, take rights of the states to affect their 
own national laws in their territorial waters. UNCLOS states that territorial waters of states 
remain under the sovereignty of those particular states. However, foreign ships have a right of 
innocent passage to navigate through (Gibson, 2009). The law of the sea “UNCLOS” provides 
a way for states to enforce national legislations which might affect foreign ships for the purpose 
of safety, environmental protection, customs and immigration control. The law of the sea 
“UNCLOS”, however, has limitations when it comes to enforcement of criminal laws against 
foreign ships in a coastal state. The territorial waters of a coastal state remains under 
sovereignty of that particular states, that national laws of the coastal state takes precedence in 
application of criminal activities, argues Gibson. His argument suggests that national legal 
framework of a states has international law connotations that might affect national law structure 
and enforcement.  
Region/Continental dimension  
 
The regional maritime security gives another dimension that might provide complexity to the 
South African situation. Due to its geographic location, South Africa’s coastal border starts 
from Namibia on the South Atlantic Ocean stretching all the way to Mozambique on the South 
Indian Ocean (Venter, 2015). South African waters connect shipping routes from the North 
Indian Ocean and North Atlantic Ocean, making the country one of the key important member 
states in the region. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, states 
are compelled to fully cooperate in repressing piracy and illicit trafficking of drugs (Lautier, 
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2013). As a Southern African Development Community (SADC) member state, South Africa 
is supposed to share intelligence information and cooperate with other SADC members in 
countering security threats within the SADC region (Lautier, 2013).  
Furthermore, in August 2011, SADC adopted a Maritime Security Strategy for the purpose of 
forming a joint operation in an attempt to eradicate acts of piracy along the sea and lakes in the 
SADC region (Coelho, 2013). The strategy does not indicate how it will ensure a minimum 
participation of the landlocked countries that require trade via the sea based countries 
(Royeppen, 2016).  Royeppen & Kornegy, (2015) recommends that there is a need to 
interrogate the role of the landlocked states and the development of cooperation. The strategy 
is of more benefit to Tanzania and Mozambique whose strategy design and implementation is 
paid for by South Africa (Coelho, 2013).  
In view of the historical colonial legacy, governments were channelled towards focusing 
resources towards the landside and neglect the sea, as such countries of the SADC region have 
limited naval capabilities (Louw-Vaudran, 2014). Because of this, South Africa opted to lead 
the maritime security operations until such time that other countries are able to build their own 
naval capacities (Louw-Vaudran, 2014). 
These regional cooperation mechanisms present a profound challenge for the region. Firstly 
the lack of domestic laws in many African states to successfully prosecute criminal activities 
at sea (Fouche, 2014). Secondly, a lack of adequate training for the navies to deal with civilian 
crime scenes in a manner that will be admissible in a court of law in order to ensure successful 
prosecution (Fouche, 2014). Thirdly, poor governance seems to be another major issue as stated 
by Roelofse (2014). South Africa's involvement in the SADC agenda might seem beneficial to 
the foreign policy obligation; however, it is not clear whether South Africa can afford to 
prioritise foreign policy over national obligations on maritime security issues.  
 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGIES 
 
Definitions of terminologies as discussed in the above chapter where inter-relations exist 
between national security strategy and maritime security strategy. It was deemed necessary to 
review maritime security strategies from other countries and compare such approaches and 
relations. In a stalk entitled “why have a national security strategy”, Malaquias (2017) referred 
to the process as a clear break from the past security regime allowing the formulation of new 
ways for national security. Malaquias (2017) further states that there are many reasons to 
motivate the process of developing the maritime security strategy, and referred to internal self-
assessment of a country, a need for a political vision and qualitative approach. Based on his 
argument, the research considered three strategies from the United Kingdom, Spain and India, 
developed between 2013, 2014 and 2015. The said strategies where evaluated for the purpose 
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Indian Maritime Security Strategy 
 
The Indian maritime security strategy was published in 2015 under the Naval Strategic 
Publication. The 103 page strategy document, which was compiled and issued by the Chief of 
Navy, details guidelines for India’s growth, development and deployment of the navy.  The 
strategy document also mentions the utilisation and potential of increasing maritime 
cooperation and coordination across India’s multi-agencies and captured primary and 
secondary national priority areas and distinguished what is considered non-traditional and 
traditional threats.   
 
Non-traditional maritime security threats are identified as maritime terrorism which might 
target industrial centres, ports, ships, tourist centres, iconic structure, offshore oil production 
and nuclear power plants. This is said to be the newest threat expanding from land to sea and 
impacting maritime nations. Traditional threats are said to be historical in the India waters and 
are comprised of unregulated activities at sea as well as what is considered to be the oldest 
threats. The unregulated activities at sea are categorised as trafficking, smuggling, illegal 
fishing, proliferation of arms, etc. while piracy and armed robbery at sea are said to be the 
oldest maritime security threats. Piracy and armed robbery at sea is said to target maritime 
trade which in return affect the economic development of India. When referring to the area of 
interest which has direct effect to India, this document identified countries affecting India’s 
national maritime security as Somalia and Gulf of Aden. Below is the map reflecting the area 
that was affected by piracy between 2005 to 2010. The strategy does not only list the threats 
but also identifies what a particular threat will constitute to India. 
 




Figure 2: Map reflecting piracy threats to India 
Source: The Indian Ocean 
 
In order to ensure a holistic approach, the strategy is divided into chapters such as strategy for 
deterrence, strategy for conflict, strategy for shipping and environment, strategy for coastal and 
offshore and strategy for maritime force and capability each of which focuses on a specific 
area. In essence, therefore, the Indian Maritime Security Strategy assumes an all-encompassing 
approach into maritime security. In addition, the maritime economic growth of India is 
reflected into the strategy, providing clear guidelines to the implementers of India’s national 
maritime security interests. This has resulted in the growth of crude oil imports for 2014-2015 
and growth of Indian shipping (Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 2015). 
 Spain national maritime security strategy framework  
 
Spain National Maritime Security Strategy (2013) is administered under the leadership of the 
Prime Minister and fully managed under the country’s national security systems. The strategy 
takes cognisance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and other 
international conventions as a baseline for their legal framework. The structure of the strategy 
makes provision for the governance of the national maritime security strategy under the 
National Security Policy and is structured in such a manner that it harmonises operational 
processes from all state actors and resources from the public and private sectors as well as 
society in general. Stakeholders include ship operators, shipping companies, maritime transport 
and fisheries. 
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Emphasis is made on drafting protocols for joint operations amongst role players, a 
collaboration of existing resources from all parties, such as facilities, vessels, aircraft, 
education and training. Future centralised procurement of assets will be managed centrally 
through a comprehensive information system. The said strategy provides a brought view of 
how the national maritime security strategy is formulated, governed and managed. While 
recognising its national interests, Spain recognises its responsibility towards its neighbouring 
countries and the importance of maintaining a sound relationship.  
 
The country votes to continue promoting bilateral and multilateral agreements in the promotion 
of maritime security within its zone. The strategy document defines its maritime security 
threats and risks as illicit trafficking, piracy, acts against underwater cultural heritage, 
proliferation of arms and ammunition1, irregular immigration and illicit trafficking of 
immigrants, cyber threats, maritime accidents, terrorism, natural disasters and illegal 
exploitation of maritime resources.   
 
United Kingdom National Maritime Strategy  
 
The United Kingdom’s National Maritime Strategy (2014) has a number of pillars which 
include: 
 Understanding the strategy and the maritime domain in order to identify threats and 
opportunities; 
 Influence by participating in the international maritime security engagements; 
 Preventing threats from the course by supporting capacity building to neighbouring 
countries, protection against existing threats; and 
 Responding through policing and prosecution.  
 
The United Kingdom’s approach is based on two concepts, "integration" and "collaboration". 
Integration brings together 16 government departments whose roles and responsibilities are 
outlined in the strategy while ensuring that the strategy remains within the National Security 
Strategy framework. Provision is also made for collaboration at national, regional and 
multinational level. Governance of the strategy is located at the ministerial level and includes 
senior officials from different government departments chaired by the Department of 
Transport. The National Security Council is engaged when necessary. These officials report 
directly to the ministerial working group which provides an oversight of the national maritime 
security and co-ordinates and drives the strategy forward. The figure below portrays the 
governance organogram structure for the strategy: 
                                                          
1 Proliferation of arms: a rapid increase in the number illegal arms    
20 | P a g e  
 
Ministerial Working Group 
on Maritime Security 
Senior Official Bodies
National Maritime Security 













Figure 3: Illustration of the UK's Maritime Security Governance Structure 
Source: UK National Strategy for Maritime Security  
 
The strategy also defines the UK’s maritime zones in detail. These zones cover The United 
Kingdom’s baseline, internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, 
continental shelves and the high seas. The strategy also talks to an establishment of a National 
Maritime Information Centre which collects maritime security related data from different state 
departments and their agencies. The centre provides real-time data needed to support maritime 
security operational requirements.  
 
The section discussed the different perspectives of national maritime security strategy, arguing 
that there are a number of aspects that need to be considered when developing a national 
maritime security strategy. There is consensus amongst writers that there is no single or 
universal definition for maritime security and that authors define the concept according to the 
environment at the time of writing. The section further discussed the difference between 
maritime security, national security and maritime strategy. The three concepts give a different 
perspective of the area being discussed, national security being the overall security of the 
country, while maritime security looks at the maritime environment with maritime strategy 
concerned with planning. Having discussed these concepts, attempts were made to understand 
what a national maritime security strategy is and what constitute it.  
 
The samples from Spain, India and the UK indicated that the two strategies were driven from 
a high level of government. Their maritime security definition covers the area beyond their 
country which is the neighbouring countries. The discussion on the three strategies clearly 
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concurs with the argument that in order to have a national maritime security strategy a clearly 
customised definition of the strategy which will define the size, the nature of resources required 
and type of threat to be protected is required.  
 
When developing a national maritime security strategy, these countries demonstrated different 
approaches in the leadership of their strategy processes. Spain governs the strategy under the 
leadership if it’s Prime Minister while the United Kingdom elevated the process to Cabinet and 
empowered the Department of Transport with authority to lead and Chair maritime security 
meetings. When consideration was given to the Indian national maritime security strategy, on 
the other hand, leadership and governance was solely allocated to the Secretary of defence. 
This analysis demonstrates that this process remains a sovereign agenda and that governments 
need to take a specific role in the development of a national maritime security strategy.  
 
SOUTH AFRICA’S MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
The research topic evaluates a need for a collaborative South African national maritime security 
strategy. On this topic the research reflects on the current South African maritime environment. 
The first aspect describe the sea space referred to as South Africa’s territorial waters.   
South Africa’s territorial waters within the sea 
 
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982), the sea 
is divided into networks of maritime zones in which States have different powers and duties 
towards their territorial waters (Gibson, 2009, p. 61). South Africa has defined its maritime 
zone as contained in the Maritime Zone Act (15 of 1994) which provides for a detailed 
definition of the maritime zone. The act refers to: 
 The baseline as the low water line joining the ground; 
 internal waters as all waters landwards of the baseline and all the harbours; 
  territorial waters as the sea within twelve nautical miles from the baseline; 
 contiguous zone as the sea beyond territorial waters but with a distance of twenty-four 
nautical miles from the baseline;  
 maritime culture zone as the sea beyond territorial waters but with a distance of twenty-
four nautical miles from the baseline;  
 exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as the sea beyond territorial waters but with a distance 
of two hundred nautical miles from the baseline; and the  
 continental shelf as defined by the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982). The Figure below illustrates South Africa’s maritime zone.          
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Figure 4: Maritime Zones of South Africa 
Source: SANGP100, 2006   
UNCLOS recognises the potential for economic growth in the maritime domain and makes the 
provision for the extension of the EEZ to more than 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
(Fouche, 2014). The geostrategic position of South Africa places the country in the maritime 
choke point surrounded by three oceans: the Indian, South Atlantic and Southern Oceans with 
a coastline of 3924km (SANGP100, 2006). The blue economy is critical for South Africa and 
its neighbours as 50% of its GDP comes from trade with 95% of this contributed by maritime 
trade while 30% of the world’s oil supply passes through the Cape (South African Defence 
Review, 2015). Annually, the country's ports host about 12 000 ships that carry about 200 
million tonnes of import and export freight (Jernberg, 2015). These activities amount to over 
$4 billion monthly spend on shipping activities (Jernberg, 2015). Jernberg (2015) further notes 
that not only does South Africa’s coastline carry so much trade volumes, its sea route holds a 
geopolitical sensitivity when it comes to mineral exploration. Based on this discussion we can 
conclude that South Africa is a maritime nation, accordingly a system of governance must exist 
in order to govern the maritime space. That takes us to the next chapter which evaluate the 
current government structures in place.     
 
Present maritime security governance 
 
The South African maritime security environment requires the attention of different 
government departments, whose roles are partially in the maritime domain. The strategic 
planning reports of these departments were reviewed to assess whether they mention maritime 
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security as one of their deliverables. Hutchful (2008) and Balwin (1999) refer to the importance 
of defining the maritime security environment in order to understand South Africa’s maritime 
security status. Reports from the Department of Transport (DOT), Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA), South African Revenue Service (SARS), South African Police (SAPS), South African 
Defence Force (SANDF), State Security Agency (SSA) and Department of Environmental 
Affairs (DEA) were reviewed to get a deeper understanding of the roles and responsibilities in 
relation to maritime security and the prioritisation of their resources to assess whether the issues 
under discussion are considered national priorities.     
 
The Department of Transport (DOT) is constitutionally mandated and legislated to "provide 
safe, reliable, efficient, effective, affordable and integrated transport service that meet the needs 
of passenger and freight users" (DOT, 2015). In accordance with its 2015/2016 strategic 
document, the department has seven programmes which include maritime transportation.  
Under maritime transport, the department is responsible for the South African Maritime Safety 
Authority (SAMSA) which is designated as the "Administration" in terms of IMO 
requirements. In order to effect maritime security issues as part of its international obligation, 
DOT developed Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004, under its Merchant 
Shipping Act (1951).  The purpose of these regulations is to safeguard against unlawful 
interference with maritime transport (The Merchant Shipping Act, 1951). It should, however, 
be noted that these regulations only give a regulatory framework for the implementation of ship 
security and port/port facility security interface. The framework does not mandate the 
department to cover national maritime security issues. South Africa’s national security strategy 
is documented in Chapter 11 of the constitution. Chapter 11 of the constitution identifies the 
Defence force, Police Service and the Intelligence service as the three national security 
structures mandated with national security.       
 
The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has immigration affairs as part of its primary 
mandate, the control of the movement of the person inside and outside South African borders. 
The DHA authorises and records the entry and exit of any person through the port of entry and 
can prohibit entry of a foreign national and grant refugee status to an asylum seeker (DHA, 
2015). In 2013, the South African government through its cabinet mandated the DHA to lead 
the establishment of a Border Management Agency (BMA) (DHA, 2015). The primary purpose 
of the BMA is to secure South African borders and ensure that efficient facilitation of legitimate 
people and goods through the port of entry, co-operation and co-ordination with other organs 
of states, border communication or any other persons on its border law enforcement function 
its implemented (Border Management Authority Bill, 2016). The BMA mandate also covers 
maritime borders, ensuring maritime security through the development of strategies and sub-
strategies, to defend, protect, secure and ensure well-managed borders by 2018/2019. 
 
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) has its sole mandate to provide a customs 
service that facilitate trade, protects South African borders and optimise revenue collection. 
SARS engages in multilateral agreements on legal instruments for the purpose of simplifying 
trade documents, streamlining border procedures and automation of border processes. The 
department’s other function is to fight international terrorism and security, adopt the full use 
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of detection and investigation techniques, risk profiling, intelligence sharing, detector dogs, 
etc. 
 
The South African Police (SAPS) is constitutionally mandated to prevent, combat and 
investigate crime as well as to create a safe and secure environment for all people in South 
Africa. In terms of their Strategic Plan 2014-2019, SAPS is mandated to protect and secure 
South Africa's borders effectively by reacting to crime-related hits and to increase the reporting 
of unlawful possession of and dealing in drugs by at least 13%.  
 
The South African Defence Force (SANDF) as contained in their Strategic Plan (2015-2020), 
the Department contributes by developing sub-strategies in support of an overreaching strategy 
to defend, protect, secure and ensure well-managed borders security of the land, air and 
maritime borders. 
 
The mission of the State Security Agency (SSA) is to provide critical and unique intelligence 
on threats and opportunities for the government to advance South Africa’s national security 
interests (SSA, 2017). As contained in its National Strategic Intelligence Act, Act 39 of 1994. 
The function of the Agency is to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse domestic intelligence 
in order to identify any threats or potential threats to the security of the republic or its people. 
To supply intelligence information threats to the South African Police Service for the purpose 
of investigating any offences and to provide such information to the Department of Home 
Affairs for the purpose of fulfilling any immigration functions.  
 
The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) has, under its branches, the Ocean & 
Coasts branch. The purpose of the branch is to integrate various role players, promote, manage 
and apply strategic leadership on oceans and coastal conservation in South Africa. DEA 
acknowledges the marine and coastal environment are South Africa’s national assets as it 
provides economic, social and ecological services. It is the aim of the Department to protect 
and conserve the ocean’s coastal environment by working towards achieving a comprehensive 
oceans management policy and legislation in South Africa (DEA, 2017). 
 
The application of system of governance is not clearly defined and discussed. The state 
department discussed above are legally mandated constitutionally to handle different matter of 
the state. The said state of governance clearly indicate a disjoint between these maritime 
security stakeholders. There is however, mention of integration of different role-players and 
streamlining of border procedures. That states an acknowledgement of a need for collaboration. 
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Bueger (2015) indicates that the meaning of maritime security varies amongst writers due to 
the contexts in which writers write about it. Despite lack of consensus on the definition, 
maritime security has become one of the key national interests for many maritime nations 
including South Africa. One of the challenges faced by South Africa on the issue of maritime 
security is that the country is tasked with the responsibility of managing an ocean space larger 
than its land territory. This poses a challenge for collaborative governance (Operation Phakisa, 
2014). Intrinsically, evaluating whether South Africa require a collaborative national maritime 
security strategy to manage its ocean space was sensible for this research. This research was 
further motivated by a gap in literature on the varied interpretation of the definition of maritime 
security amongst its relevant stakeholders with a particular focus on what maritime security 
would mean for South Africa. The research therefore sought to establish underlying reasons, 
opinions and motivations on the state of the country on maritime security and whether the 
country requires such a strategy.   
 
The researcher applied a qualitative research method, to generate theories of maritime security, 
national security and maritime strategy. Bryman (2012) indicates that that this type of research 
qualifies as a social research in the academic world. According to Bryman (2012) the flow of 
a social research includes elements such as literature review, conceptual framework, research 
questions, sampling, data collection, data analysis, discussions and recommendations. Baxter 
& Jack (2008, p. 544) suggest that a qualitative case study research is “an approach to research 
that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources” 
and provides tools for studying complex phenomena within their contexts. Eisenhardt (1989, 
p. 534) also adds that “the case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings” 
 
The research applied a Case Study design in order to generate the kind of data the study requires 
to answer the research question. The Case Study design allowed the researcher to apply a multi-
perspective analysis in the research by considering the voices and views of government 
maritime stakeholders together with its own state entities and private maritime industry 
participants (Nieuwenhuis, 2007). The said design was applied in order to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of how maritime security stakeholders in South Africa relate and 
interact which each other in the maritime security environment, and how they make meaning 
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DATA COLLECTION  
 
Bryman (2012) points out that data collection method in a qualitative research is conducted 
through three major sources: observations, documentations and interviews. Nieuwenhuis 
(2007) defines observation in a data collection process as a "systematic process of recording 
the behavioural patterns of participants, objects and occurrences without necessarily 
questioning or communicating with them". Interviews on the other had explored the views of 
the participants, their experienced beliefs and what motivates individual participants 
Nieuwenhuis (2007). In conducting this research, the researcher conducted individual 
interviews on identified individuals in government departments, state-owned entities and 
private maritime industry and used documentation for the collection of data. Reliability of data 
was increased through a method called “triangulation”. Data triangulation is untilised to verify 
data and applied in order to ensure that data is rich, robust, comprehensive and well-developed, 
as the method allows utilization of more methods to collect data on the same phenomenon 
(Kelly, in Terre Blanch & Durrheim, 1999). The researcher utilised two types of data collection 
methods, primary and secondary data.    
 
Primary data collection 
 
The researcher utilised primary data collection sources in order to gain a deeper understanding 
of the phenomenon under investigation. The researcher interviewed the respondents in their 
place of work and notes were taken to gather information from the respondents. The researcher 
conducted interviews in order to engage in two-way conversations with identified maritime 
security stakeholders in an interview process. Interviews were conducted with officials from 
the selected departments namely South African Police Services, South African National 
Defence Force, Department of Transport, Department of Home Affairs, South African 
Maritime Safety Authority, Transnet National Ports Authority and Private industry. The aim 
of the interviews was to establish the views, ideas, beliefs, opinions and behaviours of the 
current South African maritime security stakeholders with regard to the need for a collaborative 
national maritime security strategy (Nieuwenhuis, 2007). The interview process was conducted 
with identified maritime security stakeholders from government departments, state-owned 
entities and private maritime organisations. The collaborative national maritime security 
strategy is not a familiar phenomenon in South Africa hence the researcher applied a semi-
structured interview process in order to direct the research towards getting answers to the 
research question (Nieuwenhuis, 2007). This process allowed for probing in order to get more 
clarification on the phenomenon under investigation. In order to avoid a “hawthorne effect” 
which is defined as the possibility of participants in a research study changing their behavior 
because they know that they are in a study, or model their answers in order to suit the 
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Secondary data collection 
 
Secondary data is considered as data extracted from the primary data (Leedy & Ormond, 2014) 
or pre-existing data that was obtained for purposes other than the current research. The initial 
data was collected from scholarly journals, published books, policy reports, conference papers 
and other documents deemed relevant by the researcher. In addition to the secondary data, data 
was also collected from sources such as the internet, newspaper articles and corporate 
magazines in the field of maritime security in general. The researcher also considered data 
contained in departmental annual reports, policy statements, legislations, conference papers 




Leedy & Ormond, (2014) point out that data analysis in a qualitative study involves organising 
the data chronologically, categorising, interpreting and identifying patterns and synthesis. 
However, they also state that there is no single way or right way of analysing data in a 
qualitative research (Leedy & Ormond, 2014). The data analysis process for this study was 
started during the data collection process which meant that the researcher might have made 
preliminary conclusions which might have influenced the data collection process later on. 
However, a triangulation approach was applied in order to get the same conclusion from a 
difference source. The research applied thematic data analyses analysis process, information 
was separated from the notes written during the interviews.    
 
The researcher applied a thematic data analysis approach (Bryman, 2012). The thematic data 
analysis approach allowed the researcher to sort and categorise information into meaningful 
data themes. The approach was suitable for this type of a research because different data 
sources were consulted to source answers to the research question. The data analysis process 
involved breaking the data into manageable texts, patterns and relationships (Mouton, 2001). 
This process was applied in order to gain a deeper meaning of the phenomenon. The researcher 
sought to uncover information about a need for a collaborative national maritime security 
strategy, current trends and patterns. The data analysis process allowed the Researcher to 
identify common recurring issues and out of that process, the main themes that summarised the 
viewpoints were collected. The process allowed capturing the finer nuances of meaning not 
captured by original coding systems as an interpretation of data (Mouton, 2001). Deep insights 
brought new knowledge in the maritime security industry. This is in agreement with Mouton's 
approach of interpretation (Mouton, 2001).  
  
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
 
Data reliability and validity are key aspects of a research report that distinguish the difference 
between a poor and good research work (Taylor & Asmundson, 2007). Data Validation 
determines what the research was intending to measure or how truthful the research results are. 
In other words, does the research instrument allow you to hit “the bull’s eye” of your research 
objective? The researcher generally determines validity by asking a series of questions, and 
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often look for the answers in the research of others” (Joppe, 2000, p. 1). Taylor & Asmundson, 
(2007, p. 23) note that validity in a research report can be distinguished between "external" 
meaning "the generalisation of the research findings" and the “internal” meaning “is matter of 
a degree rather than one of presence or absence” . The researcher attempted as far as possible 
to apply the minimum requirements of both validity and reliability in the study. The evaluation 
of data collected by the researcher was conducted in accordance with member-checking and 
triangulation strategy (multiple sources of data) (Maree, 2008). The researcher triangulated the 
findings through the selection of maritime security stakeholders. The participants were 
members of Maritime Security Advisory Committee as appointed by the Director General of 
Transport in terms of Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004.  In addition, 





The population for this research comprised of individuals from all governmental and private 
sector maritime stakeholders. It is from this population that the sample was derived from. The 
study utilised a non-probability sampling as the study did not intend to produce statistic 
representation (Bryman, 2008). The researcher applied a purposive sampling method and 
selected relevant South African government maritime security stakeholders, individuals from 
state-owned entities and private maritime industry participants. The population of the said 
sampling was selected from the Department of Transport, South African Police Service, 
Department of Home Affairs, South African Defence Force, Transnet National Ports Authority, 
South African Maritime Safety Authority and Private maritime industry participants. Leedy & 
Ormrod (2014) note that the qualitative research method in its nature uses a non-probability 
sampling for different sources. The said sampling method is suitable for this study as the 
researcher utilised different sources for data collection.  
The method is appropriate for the research as the study gained a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation. The research applied purposive sampling (another type of 
non-probability sampling) and snow-ball sampling which are suitable for an exploratory type 
of research (Maree, 2008). In identifying respondents, the Researcher used her contacts and 
networks. The researcher was previously employed at the Department of Transport, as a Deputy 
Director Maritime Security and used to work with some of the initial contacts for the purposive 
sampling aspect. The researcher is, therefore, familiar with the environment and some of the 
participants. Although the method applied might seem to be biased in the selection process of 
participants, it also allowed the researcher to select relevant personnel who will contribute 
positively to the research paper particularly as these were mostly expert interviews where 
people with specialised knowledge were critical to the research.   
Further to the identification of the organisations, the researcher utilised her networks and 
connections to access interview participants with extensive experience of maritime security 
issues in South Africa. The selection involved identification of participants who were in the 
national maritime security formulation, current maritime security programmes and maritime 
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security implementation. The researcher also identified participants with sailing experience as 
seafarers to give the perspective of what really happens at sea. The sampling was, therefore, 
selected in order to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon from different angles.  
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
 
Research, particularly qualitative research can expose respondents to harm if proper ethical 
considerations were not applied in the conduct of the research. With this in mind, ethical 
consideration were incorporated as part of the research process to protect the dignity of the 
respondent by ensuring that no harm or embarrassment befalls them as a consequence of their 
participation in this research. Bryman, (2012, p. 130) “states that ethical issues in social 
research cannot be ignored, "as they relate directly to the integrity of the piece of research and 
of the disciplines that are involved".  Respondents were informed that their identities would be 
protected and no names would be revealed in the research while the information they provided 
would be used in aggregate where possible. This seems to have put some respondents at ease 
as some might have been reluctant to give information. It is important that the data collected 
be protected from disclosure and linkage to the participants. Bryman (2012, p. 138) further 
adds that participants should be given as much information as possible as this will be needed 
to make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to participate in the study. During 
the interviews, the researcher gave insights into the nature of the study and ensured respondents 
that their personal identity and privacy will be protected. A consent form was signed by the 




The researcher is familiar with maritime security environment as she served the Department of 
Transport over a period of 10 years. The researcher was, however, not able to access some of 
the information that she uses to have access to while she was still employed at the Department 
of Transport. Reasonable care was taken by the researcher to ensure that the required data 
needed for this research was obtained and confidentiality of privileged information was 
observed. The researcher also had contacts of the relevant maritime security key stakeholders, 
including officials from the Department of Transport, whose insights were critical to the 
research. Some limitations were experienced during the interview process, where some of the 
main identified maritime security stakeholders were not accessible due to other factors such as 
prior commitments. An alternative official within the same organisation was considered by the 
researcher together with his/her experience.  
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To collect primary data, the researcher utilized the interviews process which promoted a two-
way conversation with identified maritime security stakeholders as listed in the table below. 
The purpose of the interviews was to establish the views, ideas, beliefs, opinions and 
behaviours of the current South African maritime security stakeholders with regard to the need 
for a collaborative national maritime security strategy. The interview process was conducted 
with the maritime security stakeholders from government departments, state owned entities 
and private maritime industry as identified below. The table tabulates the list of respondents 
representing each maritime security stakeholder, provides the total number of years of 
experience in the maritime security environment each respondent has and their area of focus.  
 
The researcher selected specific maritime security participants located within the maritime 
security environment who possessed more than 5 years of working experience in the maritime 
security environment. There were eight identified participants, out of the eight, two had less 
than ten years of experience in the maritime security environment while six had more than 
fifteen years of experience. The individuals interviewed were conducted with key members of 
management from national government, law enforcement, state owned entities and private 
maritime industry participants. These individuals formed part of the National Maritime 
Security Advisory Committee and the newly established National Border Management Agency 
initiative. Data collected from the interview process was transcribed by the researcher. This 
research report has been analysed in terms of the qualitative research methodology.  
    






experience   
Area of responsibility 
1. Respondent “A” 
 
Maritime expect   19yrs Governance and policy 
implementation 
2. Respondent “B” National 
Government  
20yrs Governance and Policy development 
in maritime transport  




7yrs Policy implementation  




10yrs Policy implementation  
5. Respondent “E” 
 
Maritime expect  22yrs Private maritime industry participants  




7yrs Governance and Policy development 
in maritime security  




15yrs  Governance and Policy development 
in border policing  
  
Data is presented in a chronological order of “A” up to “G” in the form of participant responses 
to the research questions.  
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RESPONDENT “A”   
 
Background information on respondent “A” 
 
Respondent “A” was currently employed in a state-owned entity responsible for managing 
maritime projects, stakeholder management, strategic development and business development. 
The respondent had sailed as a seafarer in commercial ships for more than 8 years before 
joining a government department. As a government employee, the respondent has over 19 years 
of working experience as a maritime professional. He also serves as a member of the panel of 
experts during court of marine enquiry for maritime safety accidents and incidents. 
 
What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy? 
In his view the national maritime security strategy should be defined by the country’s 
geographic location, what needs to be protected, the country’s security needs and clearly 
defined maritime security threats. According to the respondent, South Africa is referred to as 
area seven in terms of the search and rescue making the country’s EEZ, larger than its land 
area. The respondent suggested that the definition would assist by defining the distance that 
needs to be protected. He further stated that maritime law might mean different things to each 
state, depending on whether it’s a port state or coastal state and degree of susceptibility to 
illegal of legal dumping at sea. The respondent indicated that the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships demarcates and defines what is considered illegal and 
legal dumping at sea.  
 
Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement  
  
The respondent noted that issues of national security remains sovereign to individual states, in 
order to protect the state against any foreign threats. He pointed out that South Africa had three 
national departments with national security mandate. These departments are the South African 
Defence Force (SANDF), South African Police Service (SAPS) and State Security Agency 
(SSA).   
 
Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa  
 
The respondent agreed that South Africa required a national maritime security strategy in order 
to coordinate resources in the fight against any maritime crimes. The strategy would assist by 
developing a chain of command directed towards reporting and responding to any maritime 
security threats in the country. He said it was currently not clear who did what and as such, 
departments worked in isolation. He supported his statement by stating that after a fishing boat 
sank along Port Elizabeth, the fisherman was only rescued after three hours. A signal was sent 
by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to government and non-government 
entities involved in the maritime rescue at sea. However, it was later discovered that the navy 
was not aware of the need to assist as the signal was not received. The challenge was that 
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MRCC does not coordinate the response but simply send a signal out and hope that one of these 
entities will respond and rescue the ships under distress. He emphasised that there was no 
central place for control and command as MRCC was just a conveyer of massages or signals 
that ships in distress dispatch.  
 
With the existence of a national maritime security strategy, roles and responsibilities would be 
clearly defined at national level where planning and coordination of resources would be made 
with clear areas of accountability. The respondent believed that South Africa did have the 
capacity and resources to develop a national maritime security strategy. He pointed out that the 
country had a  maritime security regulatory framework, had signed a number of international 
conventions meaning that it had international backup support if needed, had a number of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, and support systems such as the Long Range 
Identification and Tracking of Ships (LRIT). He lamented that South Africa lacked a national 
maritime security policy which would lay a foundation to direct the country towards its national 
interests.  
 
The respondent believed that the involvement of private maritime industry was crucial as cargo 
owners, shipping agents and clearing and forwarding agents, also had information needed by 
government to profile ships, passengers and cargo. That these parties had critical information 
about the history of the ship, its last ten ports of call, cargo, etc. Such information could be 
used for security reasons only if the said private maritime industry could be compelled to 
supply the information. On the other hand the South African Revenue Service (SARS) had 
become enemy number one of these shipping agents and brokers due to tax compliance 
imposed on export and imports. He suggested that it should have a stakeholder’s relationship 
with these agencies in order to get security information. He lamented that SARS only randomly 
conducted security scanning of 10 percent of containers at ports of entry. He said such scanning 
excluded regular shippers who are given priority resulting in a gap in the security system. He 
suggested that if SARS could not search all containers, it must use other security measures to 
get security information.  
 
As South Africa had voluntary whistle blowers who offer security information such as the 
consumer forums who inform government of illegal activities, such whistle blowers should be 
incorporated into the strategy. He blamed the collapse of South Africa’s clothing 
manufacturing industry to importation of clothes from China resulting from lack of security 
and collaboration to manage the security risks at port level.     
 
When answering the question “Do you think South Africa is ready to have a national maritime 
security strategy”? He stated that South Africa was not ready because the country firstly needed 
to start by developing forums that would share information and collaborate on common issues. 
That the Constitution made provision for cooperate governance, however the constitution does 
not enforce collaboration. The country needed to have a national command centre and a 
dedicated fleet to deal with maritime security incidents along South African waters.   
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How should a national maritime security be governed? 
 
He said it was a fact that South Africa needed to effectively protect its Exclusive Economic 
Zone in order to protect food security and mineral resources from overfishing by foreign fishing 
ships. His understanding of a maritime threat was that it began with a ship, cargo and humans, 
that the three constitute any security threat. That originality of a threat is managed from the 
country of origin to the country of destination. That South Africa could learn from the Mega 
ports initiative where containers destined for the USA were scanned at the country of origin or 
last port of call before arriving in the USA ports. That other measures such as regular profiling 
of ships and categorising profiling from low, medium and high risk could improve security.   
 
He said the governance of a national maritime security strategy should be located within the 
National Planning Commission. The project should be driven from presidency, that the 
presidency had the power to pull all role players under one roof. He insisted that if the project 
were to be driven from the lower level of government it would not be effective. That relevant 
stakeholders such as legal, government, shipping agents, intelligence, customs, defence, ports 
health, transport, etc, should form part of the strategy. He said the current structures lacked 
accountability, that the roles and responsibilities should be accompanied by accountability as 
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RESPONDENT “B”   
 
Background information on respondent “B” 
 
Responded “B” was an employee of a national government department responsible for 
national maritime transport security regulation and implementation. The responded had over 
20 years of working experience in the maritime governance environment and was one of the 
officials in the country familiar with different aspects of maritime security including maritime 
security and safety, environment, policy and international relations. The respondent also led 
the development of the Merchant Shipping (maritime security) Regulations during 2004 and 
its implementation thereafter. His current job description also included looking at policy 
formulation in the maritime transport environment.      
 
What is the meaning of a national maritime security strategy? 
 
He responded by stating that in order for South Africa to define what is a national maritime 
security strategy, it was important to have a policy or legislation that talked to that. He said 
defining maritime security without first conducting a threat risk assessment of the country 
might be misleading. He suggested that while South Africa could consider different models to 
study, but such models could not be presented as they were because they lacked South African 
risk profiling. 
 
Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement     
 
He noted that South Africa currently had a Defence Review, which considered a wide range of 
national security issues including maritime, and an international framework as detailed in the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code which was ratified and made into 
national law through the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004. He said 
these regulations gave power to the Director-General of Transport over maritime transport 
security issues and ports/ ports facilities. He said the Department further saw a need to develop 
a Comprehensive National Maritime Transport Policy which was currently not available to the 
public as it was still in draft form and had to be presented to parliament before being made 
public. He indicated that the presentation of the policy to parliament was scheduled for the 
month of April 2017. The policy was developed to facilitate maritime transport collaboration 
in view of the commercial maritime transportation.   
 
The respondent also stated that the current maritime transport environment was very 
fragmented but noted that cabinet had recently issued an instruction to the Department of 
Environmental Affairs to lead the implementation of Operation Phakisa. He also suggested that 
the construction of a national maritime security framework or model had to firstly look at the 
risks profile of the country. The fact that South Africa did not have ships in its register should 
not deter the evaluation of the current South African maritime security’s risk profiling; the 
process should consider how South Africa is affected as a coastal sate. 
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Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa 
 
He believed that South Africa was not ready to move towards national maritime security 
governance. He also believed that the development of a Comprehensive Maritime Transport 
Policy (CMTP) would give a national direction for a number of issues relating to maritime 
transportation. He then stressed that a need for an integrated maritime security strategy existed, 
that the system would facilitate the collaboration of government and clusters. His view was 
that government departments were aware of their boundaries and responsibilities as such a 
coordinated approach will be effective.  
 
How should a national maritime security be governed?  
 
The respondent was of the view that South Africa was not ready to have a collaborative national 
maritime security strategy, that the current government initiatives such as boarder management 
authority, Operation Phakisa, Regional Maritime Security Strategy, Maritime Security 
Advisory Committee are not assisting the process of moving towards a collaborative efforts. 
He suggested that a move towards a collaborative national maritime security strategy should 
be coordinated only after an in-depth understanding and analysis of maritime environment was 
available. He said the department of transport should remain the custodian of maritime 
transport security issues as it did not have any vested interest in the maritime environment. He 
believed that the CMTP policy framework would further define and clarify the legal framework 
for maritime transportation and pointed out that the national maritime security strategy would 
benefit South Africa as a country as it would pull together all the resources to avoid wasteful 








Background information on Respondent “C” 
 
Respondent “C” was an employee of a state-owned entity that had a national maritime 
transport security mandate under its umbrella. The respondent had seven years of working 
experience as a maritime professional and his current job description involved maritime safety, 
security and environment. The respondent participated in a number of maritime security 
initiatives locally, regionally and internationally. He was a member of some maritime security 
committee structure in South Africa and played the role of providing technical support to 
international conventions.    
 
What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy? 
 
The respondent described in his own words what constituted a national maritime security by 
stating that it was the blue print that outlined maritime security threats to national security and 
the provision of a mitigation plan. That national maritime security strategy was an all-
encompassing document that tabulated all maritime security issues, (civilian or military 
related) in the country.  
 
The respondent further elaborated on the concept of maritime security. He stated that maritime 
security referred to specific threats that related to maritime environment. Yet on the other had 
maritime strategy looked at the overall plans of action that involved security, environment, 
safety and the economy. In conclusion, the respondent defined a national maritime security 
strategy as a programme of government or project within maritime that was intended to ensure 
the correct use of the sea, while ensuring the country’s economic growth.  
 
Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement 
 
The respondent stated that, in accordance with the South African constitution, there were three 
security agencies responsible for the primary national maritime security mandate. These were 
the State Security Agency, the South African Police Service and the South African National 
Defence Forces. While noting that there were other national departments that had national 
maritime security mandate, he said those mandates were secondary in nature or they played an 
intermediate role. He said South Africa currently did not have a written protocol or legislation 
that facilitated or coordinated the activities of the national maritime security stakeholders.  
 
He said the country had a national maritime transport coordinating structure which was called 
the Maritime Security Advisory Committee (MSAC) which was established in terms of the 
Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004. The respondent felt that the current 
MSAC structure was high enough to advice on national maritime security transportation issues. 
He further indicated that the responsibility of a national maritime transport should remain the 
responsibility of the Department of Transport. He however, noted the existence of challenges 
of inefficiency with regard to the roles and responsibilities of the role-players within the 
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structure. He stated that as much as the structure existed at national level, the environment was 
still fragmented when it came to operations.  
 
He said in another process, the Cabinet of South Africa issued an instruction for the 
establishment of a Border Management Authority (BMA). The process began with a feasibility 
study conducted by selected international maritime security stakeholders. The process grouped 
the stakeholders into small groups each of which had to give a report on its findings.  A business 
case was consolidated and presented to Cabinet and approved for implementation. The 
respondent indicated that the BMA structure would be launched by the President of South 
Africa during the year 2017. The Department of Home Affairs had been assigned the leading 
role for the implementation of the Border Management Authority Bill.    
 
Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa 
 
The respondent believed that South Africa did need a national maritime security strategy which 
would represent a blue-print for the country. He supported his statement by stating that 
currently nothing informed what needed to be protected and what areas of responsibility each 
role-player had. He suggested that South Africa would benefit from such a strategy in a sense 
that protection of South Africa’s fish and other spices from illegal fishing will be accelerated. 
He gave an example of illegal fishing and exploitation of other minerals resources that were 
currently being depleted without any detection as there was no security in those waters.  
 
He believed that South Africa had enough skills and resources to develop a national maritime 
security strategy. He indicated that what was needed was the political will and support from 
top structures of government. He suggested that the formulation of a national maritime security 
strategy start by firstly distinguishing the difference between a national maritime security 
strategy and a national maritime transport security strategy. In his view, such a distinction 
would provide a better understanding of what should be done, who needs to do what and what 
needs to be protected. He believed that the national maritime security strategy should remain 
the responsibility of the South African Navy and the Air force and the national maritime 
transport security strategy should remain with the Department of Transport. Maritime security 
stakeholders to be involved in the process should be all those that are in existence, including 
the involvement of the private maritime industry. He also suggested that government needs to 
establish how best to utilise them in the strategy.       
 
How should a national maritime security be governed?  
 
In his response to the question “how should the national maritime security strategy be 
governed?”, he stated that the process should be driven from cabinet, that it should be a cabinet 
directive that ordered the development in order for it to gain the support it required. He said 
cabinet should also appoint a lead department and define the role of such a department. He 
believed that the process did not require a cabinet standing structure, that the function could be 
delegated to the lead department. He recollected a cabinet mandate that gave an instruction to 
develop a national maritime security strategy. He said the national maritime security strategy 
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should remain the responsibility of the National Defence Force and the responsibility of a 
national maritime transport security strategy a responsibility of the Department of Transport. 
In conclusion he stated that before all these strategies could be developed, clarification on 
whether South Africa required to go the cooperative route, as stipulated in the constitution, or 
the integration route as demonstrated with the BMA process needed to be obtained from the 
high levels of authority. 
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RESPONDENT “D”  
 
Background information on Respondent “D” 
 
Respondent “D” was an employee of a state-owned entity responsible for the implementation 
of maritime security policy. The respondent’s area of focus was security and governance in the 
petro-chemical, pipelines and commercial seaports environment. The respondent had more 
than ten years of working experience in the maritime security environment. The mandate was 
located within the seaports.     
 
What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy? 
 
In his view, national security constituted the safe keeping of the nation in its entirety. The 
protection of values, beliefs, democracy, institute of governance, unity, freedom, sovereignty, 
welfare and well-being of the nation. He further elaborated by stating that maritime security 
constituted the protection of the marine environment, blue economy activities and ensuring the 
rule of law and freedom of navigation. Therefore, a national maritime security strategy was a 
coherent national inter-ministerial framework aimed at improving the fight against maritime 
insecurity based on an analysis of maritime risks and threats in the short to medium term and 
with the possibility to affect strategic interests of South Africa and its neighbours.  
 
Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement 
 
He said South Africa currently had a national maritime security structure constituting of 
members of the Maritime Security Advisory Committee (MSAC) Chaired by the Department 
of Transport. The structure cascades to operational level as these members were represented at 
maritime security borders initiatives. He said the departments constituted, customs, national 
ports authority, law enforcement, metro police and national departments. The national structure 
was constituted under the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations, 2004. He 
however felt that the structure had challenges such as lack of proper coordination. He said a 
leadership vacuum existed at cabinet level in the form of a dedicated body responsible for 
maritime security in South Africa.     
 
He stated that the structure required improvement in a form of a coordinated governance at 
ministerial level. That a legislation to effect such a framework should clearly spell out the 
coordinating mechanism. He said in the absence of such a legislation, the framework would 
not be useful as stakeholders would not be held accountable for inefficiencies. The respondent 
acknowledged that the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, as documented in legislations, 
is very clear. What seems to be the challenge was the human factor. He said the human factor 
was the biggest contributing factor to the challenges experienced amongst stakeholders. He 
said without a single piece of legislation that coordinated the environment, individuals operated 
under different legislations resulting in stakeholders fighting for control of the space.  
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He said the structures at operational/port level had involved the municipal metro police, due to 
threats of squatters who resided along the harbour. He suggested that the intention of the 
squatters was to stowaways in a ship as some port infrastructures provided ease of access to 
the quay due to public (restaurants) areas along the harbour.    
 
Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa 
 
The respondent believed that South Africa required a national maritime security strategy as 
South Africa was a maritime nation trading all over the world. He said South Africa accepted 
its obligation to combine with other maritime nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and to 
protect the country’s national interests. He said South Africa would benefit from having a 
national maritime security strategy as it would secure the country’s exclusive economic zone 
and maritime domain in general and that the process would create an enabling environment for 
the blue economic activities to blossom and ensure marine safety and freedom of navigation.  
 
He also indicated that South Africa had the appropriate skills and resources at various 
institutions both in the public and private sector to develop the strategy. He said what was 
missing was coordination of purpose as well as a relevant mechanism of execution. He said the 
strategy was important in a sense that South African security interests on the blue economy 
were fundamentally linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of people. The maritime 
security strategy should aim at responding to modern risks and threats to global maritime 
security, bringing together all the relevant maritime actors (maritime safety, marine 
environmental protection, fisheries control, customs, law enforcement, defence, home affairs, 
border management agency etc).  
 
He suggested that the strategy should be all inclusive and promote a better civil-military 
cooperation and coordination. He believed that South Africa as a littoral state through which 
most national and regional trade by sea certainly channelled the country towards the 
development of a National Maritime Security Strategy. He, however suggested that the 
question of readiness should preferably be approached from a perspective of taking stock of all 
work that had been done and then conduct a gap analysis in order to determine whether there 
was any need for further preparatory work.  
 
The respondent gave examples of good strategies that South Africa could learn from such as 
those of the African Union (AU) 2050 Maritime Security Strategy, USA, France, Australia, 
Canada, and SADC 2030. He said South Africa could learn from these strategies as they applied 
a consultative process that led to the development of their national maritime security strategies.  
 
How should a national maritime security be governed?  
 
When asked how the national maritime security strategy should be governed, he replied by 
stating that the maritime security strategy was part of national security strategy. However, it 
was not purely a naval preserve, but should be hosted at an appropriate National Department 
under a specific ministry such as the Department of Transport which he considered a suitable 
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department due to its legal mandate of providing a civilian oversight which maritime security 
is deemed to be. The relevant Statute would make provision for maritime security governance 
issues. The establishment of the strategy would benefit South Africa by achieving the well-
being, prosperity and security of people. 
 
  




Background information on Respondent “E” 
 
Respondent “E” grew up in the maritime environment where his father was a fisherman. He 
began his maritime career working for railways harbour as an officer. The respondent was 
amongst the first black seafarers to enter the maritime environment, worked for shipping. He 
also studied maritime transportation at university. The respondent had more than 22years of 
working experience. He has also served at different companies as a member of the board of 
directors. The respondent is currently part of a team that conducted marine court of enquiries 
recently held in Port Elizabeth.  
 
What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy? 
 
In his view, national maritime security constitutes the safe keeping of South Africa’s borders 
in order to protect its maritime environment. He did not believe that South Africa had any 
national maritime security threats. He supported his statement by stating that there was no 
threats of war and that the country learned its lesson from the historic wars of other countries 
such Mozambique and Angola and that the country was neutral to the ideology of other 
countries making it not to be a target of conflict associated with interest of high risk countries. 
 
He said maritime security constituted the protection of South Africa’s waters against any 
threats that might emanate from within South African waters or outside. He said South Africa 
has a policy that allowed open maritime border which enabled a flood of migrants into the 
country. He said the situation exposed the country to threats associated with maritime 
transportation such as piracy and human trafficking due to its geographic location which made 
it a transhipment country. He said the challenge that came with being a transhipment hub 
enabled the rebranding of goods from a country of origin whose goods are not accepted by 
other countries to gain access to those countries. He said the country’s geographic location also 
facilitated the hosting of high risk rebranding such oil tankers.     
 
The respondent believed that the country could not begin to talk about maritime strategy while 
it does not even have a salvage strategy which is meant to protect the lives of people at sea. In 
addition, South Africa had depleted its maritime fund which is meant to fund any additional 
costs that might occur if an incident of an oil spill happens. He said international treaties were 
not in line with the national strategy of the country which also had a disjointed system. The 
respondent however believed that the Department of Transport should be the lead department 
in the development of the strategy.   
 
Governance of the national maritime security strategy   
 
The respondent felt that the national maritime security strategy should be governed through a 
lead department, which in this case should be the Department of Transport. He said the current 
setup did not promote any lead department to be nominated in the maritime space as the current 
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maritime stakeholders had their own interests at heart and would therefore not be able to put 
the interests of maritime as a whole first while the Department of Transport had a neutral 
mandate without any interests in the maritime space. He gave an example of an incident where 
14 people died while their fishing boat sank. The incident occurred due to lack of leadership 
and authority on maritime search and rescue mission as well as the absence of a salvage 
strategy. He said the maritime search and rescue could not assist those fisherman in time due 
to the inability of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to control and command 
the search and rescue mission. He said the MRCC did not have resources to respond to these 
incidents as they relied on other role-players to respond to a maritime security incident.      
 
In his view the national maritime security strategy should be governed under a leadership of a 
single ministry. The respondent made an example of what the Americans have which is the 
Coast Guard concept whose main focus is maritime law enforcement and search and rescue. 
The Coast Guard had special agent units that specialise in investigations of maritime incidents. 
He said in order for South Africa to identify the said lead agency, it firstly needed to define the 
interest of the country. On the other hand, the responded felt that the lead governance of the 
strategy should be located under Department of Trade, that the department should have the 
monitoring and evaluation sub-division to monitor the implementation of maritime regulations. 
The respondent expressed the importance of monitoring and evaluation which would detect 
financial loses earlier. 
 
He said the Department of Transport should develop the maritime transport policy which 
should be in line with the national strategic direction. He added that the current Merchant 
Shipping Act must be reviewed to reflect today’s South African environment that included the 
economic aspects of the country. It should also look its demographic position, regional 
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RESPONDENT “F”  
 
Background information on Respondent “F” 
 
Respondent “F” was the acting Chief Director of a government department that had a 
maritime security regulatory responsibility. He had seven years working experience in the 
maritime sector. The respondent formed part of a number of maritime security initiatives 
nationally, regional and internationally including the technical advising team at the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO). He also formed part of the team that worked on 
the regional maritime security strategy including other SADC maritime initiatives.  
 
What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy? 
 
He said national security was a multifaceted concept which constitute the addressing of issues 
of national security on its entirely including South African borders. The national maritime 
security on the other hand constituted the protection of the maritime environment in it’s 
entirely. He said the strategy could then have chapters that deal with different aspects such as, 
maritime transport, and fisheries, offshore installation, high seas security, border security and 
land ship interface with are the ports.  Therefore, the strategy should consider anything that 
happened in the sea. On the other hand, he said broadly speaking, the concept of maritime 
strategy was concerned with the management of the maritime space on its entirety, and beyond 
maritime security matters to cover issues of economic interest and food security.  
 
In conclusion, he said the national maritime security strategy addressed all national maritime 
concerns within the ambit of maritime security strategy which spells out how to protect the 
maritime space against piracy, illicit drug trafficking and other illegal activities.   
 
Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement 
 
The respondent stated that maritime was a matter of national competence which did fall under 
the jurisdiction of the Provincial governance mandate. He said the structure of the national 
maritime security constituted the responsibilities of all the security cluster departments which 
are the Defence Force, Department of Safety, Security and State Security Agency, the 
Department of Home Affairs, etc. These stakeholders were not governed collectively under 
any written protocol or legislation but each individual department had its own mandate. He, 
however noted that these mandates impacted on each other in the sense that what SAPS did has 
an impact on what the Department of Home Affairs did and vice versa. The respondent gave 
an example of a situation where the SAPS chased a suspected maritime offender only up to 12 
nautical miles into the sea waters but SAPS could not arrest an offender past 12 nautical miles 
otherwise the arrest would be deemed unlawful. Further to that the South African navy could 
not arrest that particular offender in their jurisdiction of past 12 nautical due to the fact that the 
offender did not commit the crime within their jurisdiction.  
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The respondent felt that the current South African maritime security arrangement was not 
working as stakeholders worked in silos which provided a risk because criminals exploited the 
gap. He said the current arrangement required strong coordination, perhaps the collapsing of 
all maritime security stakeholders into one, although that would require a Constitutional 
amendment. He said collapsing all maritime security stakeholders into one could be achieved 
by joining maritime security functions situated within departments. He also noted that this 
would also result in the collapsing of all enabling legislations into one. He suggested that the 
concept of a Border Management Agency attempted to achieve such an objective.       
 
Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa 
 
The respondent felt that South Africa urgently required a national maritime security strategy to 
enhance service and facilitate the protection of South Africa’s borders. The responded believed 
that South Africa had adequate skills and resources to develop a proper working strategy. 
According to him, the challenge was that security strategies were scattered in different 
departments limiting the ability of the country to maximise its services. The respondent 
strongly believed that the ownership of the strategy should be taken by someone within the 
security clusters. He elaborated by stating that South Africa currently had a challenge as no 
department wanted to own the strategy because it did not form part of that department’s 
national mandate. He also pointed out that the Constitution of the country identified different 
role players but did not give authority to own and lead the space to any of them. Accordingly, 
he suggested that Cabinet should decide who must take the leadership of the strategy. 
 
When discussing which stakeholders should form part of the strategy, the respondent indicated 
that South Africa had a National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, referred to as NICOC 
which had a national mandate to advise government on national security issues compiled from 
the coordination of all the intelligence information of the country. However, NICOC could not 
advice government on who to lead the development of a national maritime security strategy 
because it was not legislated statutory body. Seeing that NICOC was helpless in this matter, 
NICOC should take the matter to cabinet as it was its responsibility to find a solution. The 
respondent promoted the involvement of private maritime industry into the strategy 
development although he believed NICOC could only contribute into the strategy as the 
strategy was aimed at addressing issues of public concern. The responded felt that South Africa 
was ready to have such a strategy, and he believed the country could benefit from learning 
about the strategies of other countries such as United States of America, United Kingdom and 
Singapore.       
 
How should a national maritime security be governed? 
 
The respondent was of the view that the national maritime security strategy should only be 
governed by someone from the security implementing agencies. He suggested that Cabinet 
should provide direction on which department should be the lead agency of the maritime 
security strategy. The respondent sustained his argument by stating the example of Operation 
Phakisa which did not appoint a lead agency although it provided a framework for accelerating 
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the economic benefits of the country to address poverty and create jobs. He also noted that 
Operation Phakisa did not redefine the roles and responsibilities of its parties as every 
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RESPONDENT “G”   
 
Background information on respondent “G” 
 
Respondent “G” headed the national border policing in South Africa and had 15 years 
working experience. His department was mandated with the responsibility of over ten air 
borders, fifty-three land borders and the sea space of about twelve nautical miles. The 
Department was mandated in terms of Section 2.1.8.1J of the interim constitution stating the 
“control of the illegal movement of people and goods”.       
 
What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy? 
In response, he said national security constituted the protection of national borders, territorial 
waters, sovereignty of the state, airspace, maritime and land environment. The respondent 
referred to maritime security as the part of national security which covered all maritime port of 
entry, territorial waters, small fishing harbours international waters and South Africa’s 
exclusive economic zone. He said South Africa had a role to play in regional and international 
maritime security space and that some engagements had been demonstrated through the signing 
of the Djibouti Code of Conduct which concerned the repression of piracy and armed robbery 
of ships at sea. He added that there were also a number of other African Union initiatives that 
South Africa took part in to sustain its role in regional maritime security initiatives.           
    
Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement  
 
When asked to define the current maritime security arrangement, the despondent stated that the 
Department of Transport, through its Merchant Shipping Act, played a leading role when it 
came to commercial maritime transportation issues. He said the South African National 
Defence Force had a national mandate for ensuring safety and security of South Africa which 
included the maritime environment. He also pointed out that the South African Police Service 
had a role in the policing of South Africa’s territorial waters up to twelve nautical miles. He 
noted that this arrangement also included other state departments such as the South African 
Revenue Services and the South African Maritime Safety Authority. He stated that law 
enforcement security and civilian security was somehow balanced with all aspects covered. He 
stated that some departments who played a critical role in the maritime environment such as 
Port Health were not visible enough to play their role at national level while being more visible 
at the provincial level.   
 
The respondent noted that South Africa currently had formal structures that governed maritime 
security, such as the Maritime Security Advisory Committee (MSAC) which provided advice 
to the Director-General of Transport on all national and international commercial maritime 
security issues. He said South Africa also had another structure called Natjoint which provided 
national security issues to the Director Generals in the Justice and Crime Prevention Structures. 
However, Natjoint focused more on the law enforcement issues than security issues affecting 
commercial shipping. 
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Based on the respondent’s input, he was requested to discuss challenges affecting the current 
maritime security structures and arrangements. He indicated that due to the fragmentation of 
the industry, there were challenges in some areas while in other areas there were none. He 
suggested that the police, health and defence should closely work together at the ports of entry 
where they played a critical role. He indicated that there trade and security did not have the 
same status and that security was considered more dominant than trade. He alleged that 
fragmentation might be views as the biggest threat that is facing South Africa’s National 
Security right now. He gave an example of a ports of entry such as a port where role-players 
worked together in the same space but not share resources and information.   
 
He indicated that the situation needed improvement.  He noted the decision by government to 
develop a Border Management Authority whose piloting had been allocated to the Department 
of Home Affairs to lead. He, however, suggested that such an arrangement would not work 
well in South Africa as the country was not a federal state like the United States of America 
where such an arrangement works better due to its system of governance. With regard to the 
proposed BMA structure, he questioned how a civilian structure would give a mandate to law 
enforcement agencies. He pointed out that the South African Police Services and the Defence 
Force had constitutional mandates to protect the state and these structures observed control and 
command. He also stated that South Africa, as a democratic state, had a strong private sector 
influence, which somehow had a strong hold on government.    
 
Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa  
 
With all that in mind, the respondent was still of the view that South Africa required a national 
maritime security strategy which would manage the country’s maritime security fragmentation 
while ensuring that the balance between civilian and security was maintained with more 
emphasis put on trade.  He suggested that the country should manage to control expenditure, 
trade process and streamline all its international standards and treaties. He also indicated that 
South Africa had appropriate skills and structures to develop a comprehensive maritime 
security strategy but the country needed to go through a transitional period with more 
awareness campaigns being conducted.  
 
How should a national maritime security be governed? 
 
He suggested that the strategy should be governed and controlled in line with South Africa’s 
international and regional obligations including to the IMO and AU. Nationally the department 
of transport should remain as a lead agency working together with the Natjoint structures. The 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) should be incorporated in 
order to contribute on diplomatic channels. He also added that the governance structure should 
provide for engagement with the private maritime industry.    
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SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS  
 
In this Chapter, the respondents were presented with the research questions as documented in 
the research questionnaire. The questionnaire contained three main questions which demanded 
discussion on the meaning of national maritime security strategy; the evaluation of the current 
South African maritime security arrangement; perceptions on the need for national maritime 
security strategy; and the assessment of how the proposed strategy should be governed. The 
list of the question asked is attached as Appendix A. This research identified participants based 
on the roles and responsibilities in the maritime industry with a particular focus on maritime 
security and the number of working experience in the field. The information discussed above 
provided this research with the thoughts, views, ideas, believes and opinions rich with 
experience and knowledge gained by participants over time. The data collected from 
respondents is summarised below. 
 
Responds Defining maritime 
security strategy 
Evaluating a need  Governing of the 
strategy   
State of readiness  
“A” It should be define as 
the country’s 
geographic location, 
define what needs to be 
protected, the country’s 




The responded agrees 
that South Africa 
require a national 
maritime security 
strategy, why? to 
coordinate resources 
in the fight against 
any maritime crimes 
The governance of 
the strategy should 
be within the 
National Planning 
Commission 
located in the 
Presidency   
South Africa is not 
ready to develop 
such a strategy, 
why? South Africa 
must firstly develop 
forums that would 
share information 
and collaborate on 
common issues. 
“B” In order to define a 
South African maritime 
security strategy a risk 
profile is required  
The responded 
neither disagree nor 
agrees with whether 
South Africa requires 
a national maritime 
security strategy, 
why? he believe that 










security as it has 
not vested interest 






required prior to 
deciding on the 
collaborative.  
South Africa is not 




Because of a lack of 
a Comprehensive 
Maritime Transport 
Policy which will 
give a national 
direction for a 
number of issues 
relating to maritime 
transport.      
“C” A national maritime 
security strategy is an 
all-encompassing 
document that tabulate 
all maritime security 
issues, (civilian or 
military related) in the 
country. 
The responded agrees 
that South Africa 
need a national 
maritime security 
strategy, why? The 
strategy will 
represent a blue-print 
for the country. 
The process of 
governance should 
be driven from 
cabinet, it should be 
a cabinet directive 
that ordered the 
development of the 
said strategy in 
order for it to gain 
the support it 
required. A lead 
department should 
be appointed.  
The responded was 
silent on whether 
South Africa is 
ready or not ready 
to have such a 
strategy. 
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“D” A national maritime 
security strategy was is 
a coherent national 
inter-ministerial 
framework aimed at 
improving the fight 
against maritime 
insecurity based on an 
analysis of maritime 
risks and threats in the 
short to medium term 
and with the possibility 
to affect strategic 
interests of South 
Africa and its 
neighbours 
The responded agrees 
that South Africa 
require a national 
maritime security 
strategy, why?, that 
South Africa was a 
maritime nation 
trading all over the 
world and has 
accepted its 
obligation to combine 
with other maritime 
nations to uphold the 
freedom of the seas 
and to protect the 
country’s national 
interests.  
The strategy should 
be hosted within the 
Department of 
transport in order 
due to its legal 
mandate of 
providing a civilian 
oversight on 
maritime security.  
With regards to the 
state of readiness, 
the responded was 
silent. His in view 
that a gap analysis is 
required in order to 
determine the state 
of readiness.    
“E” A national maritime 
security constitutes the 
safe keeping of South 
Africa’s borders in 
order to protect its 
maritime environment 
The responded does 
not agree that South 
Africa require a 
national maritime 
security strategy, 
why? he believes that 
the country cannot 
discuss such a 
strategy if it does not 
even have a salvage 
strategy which is 
meant to protect the 
lives of people at sea.  
A national maritime 
security strategy 
should be governed 
under a leadership 
of a single ministry 
In not many work 
the responded 
stated that the 
national maritime 
legislations need to 
be updated, that 
include a national 
maritime policy to 
give a direction, in 
such he implies that 
the country is not 
ready to have such 
a strategy 
“F” The national maritime 
security strategy should  
address all national 
maritime concerns 
within the ambit of 
maritime security 
strategy which spells 
out how to protect the 
maritime space against 
piracy, illicit drug 
trafficking and other 
illegal activities 
The responded agrees 
that South Africa 
need a national 
maritime security 
strategy, why? in 
order to enhance 
service and facilitate 





should be governed 
by a department 
within the security 
implementing 
agencies, that 
cabinet must give a 
clear direction who 
should be a leading 
agency.  
The responded felt 
that South Africa is 
ready to have a 
national maritime 
security strategy, he 
supported his 
statement by stating 
that adequate skills 
and resources exist 
in the country.    
“G” State that national 
security constituted the 
protection of national 
borders, territorial 
waters, sovereignty of 
the state, airspace, 
maritime and land 
environment.  
The responded agrees 
that South Africa 
need a national 
maritime security 
strategy, why? in 




ensuring that the 
balance between 
civilian and security 
is maintained with 
more emphasis put on 
trade. 
The department of 
transport should 
remain as a lead 
agency working 
together with the 
Natjoint structures. 
The responded was 
silent on the status 
of readiness, 
however he 
believes that the 
country needed to 
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In this chapter, the process applied to analyse data collected in order to establish how 
participants make meaning of maritime security is presented in detail by analysing their 
perceptions, attitudes, understanding, knowledge, values, feelings, and experiences of South 
African maritime security stakeholders (Nieuwenhuis, 2008). The approach combined “content 
analyses” which refers to the utilisation of books, brochures, written documents, etc, with the 
interview process. The purpose of the study was to examine whether South Africa required a 
comprehensive national maritime security strategy; evaluate the current maritime security 
arrangement; and probe for views on how the strategy should be structured. The research found 
that defining maritime security remained a challenge with some writers referring to it as the 
latest “buzzword”, arguing that it gained its power through a vague euphemistic quality and its 
ability to embrace a multitude of possible meanings (Bueger, 2015). South Africa has, 
identified a need to protect its maritime environment against any threats that might emanate 
from internal or external factors.   
 
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY  
 
The meaning of maritime security was understood by the researcher as being a process 
encompassing all relevant aspects in the maritime environment together with national 
priorities. Maritime security is a process which describes what needs to be protected at sea, 
including marine environment, shipping, ports of entry etc and identifying what the threats 
might be. It was also found that a theoretical definition of maritime security relevant to all did 
not exist. National maritime security strategy on the other hand was defined as all processes 
set in motion and guided by the constitution, detailing planning of all maritime activities, 
protection of national maritime interests and the process of pulling together all relevant 
government maritime resources while ensuring the maximisation of all efforts.    
 
In order for the research to ensure the widest possible coverage of evaluation, the process 
distinguishing between the methodology of maritime security and national maritime security 
strategy, and the different experiences, perceptions, advices, and feelings of relevant maritime 
security stakeholders, referred to in this report as participants, was developed. The 
methodology perspective covered literature, documentation and observation and stakeholders 
review constituted interviews. In essence, the research applied a multiple indicator approach 
which utilised the same set of issues on different platforms in the research. The discussion 
below details the approaches followed to generate and collect information on which this report 
based its findings and recommendations.  
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Literature review  
 
The research evaluated general literature on maritime security and maritime transportation.  
Maritime security has generated a large body of international and regional research with much 
attention focused of maritime piracy. There is less published on maritime security strategy on 
South Africa. The study was selective in its evaluation of literature and was guided by for the 
focus on relevant literature referring to a South Africa maritime security situation in the years 
2012 to 2016. A substantial number of publications dealing with maritime security, national 
security and maritime security strategy were analysed and relevant ones are referred to as 
examples of good practise at appropriate places in the report. The literature review process also 
included the evaluation of government strategic planning documents, between 2015 and 2020 
of relevant maritime security stakeholders in SA.  
 
The researcher considered national strategic documentation of relevant maritime security 
stakeholders such as  the Department of Home Affairs’ Strategic Plan 2015-2020, the South 
African Revenue Services’ Strategic Plan 2015-2021, the South African Police Services 
Strategic Plan 2014-2019, the Department of Transport’s Strategic Plan 2015-2020, and the 
Department of Environmental Affairs’ Strategic Plan 2015-2016. The review of these 
documents was undertaken together with other departmental communications published on line 
and in the media.  
    
Interviews  
 
The respondents were presented with the research questions as documented in the research 
questionnaire. The questionnaire addressed three main questions and discussed what the 
meaning of national maritime security strategy was; an evaluation of the current South African 
maritime security arrangement; perceptions on the need for a national maritime security 
strategy; and lastly an assessment on how the proposed strategy was to be governed. The list 
of questions asked is attached as Appendix A. The researcher identified participants based on 
their roles and responsibilities in the maritime industry, in particular in maritime security and 
also the number of working experience in the field. 
 
The information discussed above provided this research with the thoughts, views, ideas, 
believes and opinions rich with experience and knowledge gained by participants over time. 
The data collected from respondents is analysed and discussed in chapter five and six below. 
The interviews process involved face to face discussions between the researcher and the 
respondent using a semi structured interview process and a research questionnaire as a tool 
guide the discussion between the interviewer and interviewee. However, the researcher was 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS/ RESULTS 
 
Defining national maritime security strategy   
 
Information received from respondents on the understanding of maritime strategy was found 
to contradict Hattendorf’s (2013) understanding that the general concept underlying maritime 
strategy has no absolute dicta. Accordingly, a constant involvement with theory is required to 
modify and correct the definition taking into consideration the historical analysis in light of the 
experiences. In view of this the respondents defined the concept of national maritime security 
strategy in two approaches. The first approach was that the concept could not be defined 
separately as defining this concept without a threat risk assessment might be misleading. Some 
respondents were of the view that while different models applied, such models might lack the 
South African risk profile.  
 
Respondents however agreed that a holistic consideration should be applied with clearly 
defined maritime security threats, areas of coverage and stakeholder management areas. Such 
an approach should involve functionalities such as state power, which includes diplomacy, 
safety and defense of merchant trade at sea, fishing, the exploitation, conservation, regulations 
and defense of the EEZ at sea, coastal defense, security of national defense, the protection of 
offshore islands, as well as participation in the regional and the world-wide concerns relating 
to the use of the oceans, the skies over the oceans and the land under the sea as suggested by 
Hattendorf (2013).  The definition should also be in line with international arrangements where 
applied maritime law might mean something different to a South Africa situation, depending 
on whether South Africa is a Coastal State or Port State. (A coastal State is a state which is not 
land locked, a port State is a state which is a coastal and has ports and offshore terminals). 
 
The second viewpoint is that national maritime security strategy referred to a plan that intends 
to protect the maritime environment in it’s entirely against any threats that might emanate from 
internal and external waters, while ensuring the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Such a 
strategy could constitute different chapters, such as maritime transport, fisheries, offshore 
installation, high seas, border security and land ship interface.   
 
Challenges emanating from current maritime security arrangements 
 
Most respondents acknowledged that South Africa desperately needed a national maritime 
security strategy in order to counter any threats that might emanate within South African 
waters. They also acknowledged that there were challenges amongst maritime security 
stakeholders. Such challenges are listed below. 
 
o They stated that South African maritime security environment was fragmented, that 
stakeholders worked in isolation;  
o That the Department of Transport was constitutionally mandated with commercial 
maritime transportation issues which included maritime search and rescue. However, 
they pointed out that the Department of Transport did not have the capacity to respond 
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to ships in destress and relied on other role players to respond. Such an arrangement 
posed a challenge as the Department of Transport did not have the authority to  control 
and command the said departments; 
o There was a clear disjoint between the views of government maritime stakeholders 
and those of the private maritime industry participants. As an example, the South 
African Revenue Services was perceived as an enemy of shipping agents and brokers. 
Such a perception did not benefit security as the private maritime industry was seen 
as possessing much needed information critical for security;  
o South Africa currently did not have a ship register as such. The absence of such a 
register was perceived as a reason why maritime transportation security might not be 
emphasized due to the view that there was no eminent threat; 
o The Constitution of South Africa mandated three law enforcement department with 
the primary national security mandate. However, there were other state departments 
that had secondary maritime security mandates. Such an arrangement created a 
challenge of prioritization and distribution of resources; 
o That South Africa was mandated by the IMO to develop a salvage strategy (a plan for 
responding to maritime incidents such as oil spills along South African waters) but 
South Africa did not currently have such a strategy. Due to the absence of such a 
strategy, the country could not even begin to talk about national maritime security 
strategy;  
o There was also a view that South Africa was aware that a national maritime security 
strategy was required. However, no department wanted to take ownership of such a 
strategy as it was not their national mandate to do so; and 
o South Africa had NICOC whose mandate was to advice government on national 
security issues. However, NICOC was failing to advice government on the issue of 
maritime security strategy as it was not a statutory body. 
 
Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy  
 
Out of the seven respondents, respondents “A”, “C”, “D”, “F” and “G” who forms the majority 
agrees that South Africa needed to develop a comprehensive National Maritime Security 
Strategy as the country had laid a good base on international engagement for maritime security, 
such as the ratification of the ISPS Code and other maritime treaties. The country also had a 
solid national legal framework and justice system to enforce the monitoring of maritime 
security. Recent activities included the development of the Border Management Authority Bill 
and the draft Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy which was currently out for public 
comment. That South Africa had the political will was recently demonstrated by the President 
of South Africa who announced government’s initiative for unlocking the economic potential 
of South Africa’s oceans.  
 
That South Africa had national structures such as the Maritime Security Advisory Committee 
(MSAC) chaired by the Department of Transport in place. The structure advised the Director-
General of Transport on commercial maritime security related issues. Further, that there were 
other security clusters governed from cabinet through the NATJOINT which affiliated to 
55 | P a g e  
 
Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster and NATJOC structures. These structures 
covered both civilian oversight and law enforcement agencies. South Africa also had fully 
operational defense force, police service, and intelligence structures. Over and above that, the 
country had other civilian structures that had maritime security interests at heart. They also 
believed that the strategy would benefit the country by: 
 
o Providing a clear chain of command for reporting and responding to maritime security 
threats and incidents in the country; 
o Facilitating the collaboration of all relevant systems of government and clusters;  
o Representing a blue print of maritime in the country;   
o Clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of relevant maritime security 
stakeholders nationally; 
o Planning and coordinating all government resources in order to dispatch such resources 
under one system of governance and save government money from duplications;  
o Ensuring accountability of those who were inefficient under one governance system; 
and 
o Providing the much needed protection for fish and other sea species from illegal fishing 
and such protection should be accelerated. 
 
However, the views of respondents differed when it came to the state of readiness of South 
Africa to have a national maritime security strategy. Three respondents are of the view that 
South Africa is not ready to have such a strategy, stating reasons such as, South Africa must 
firstly develop forums that would share information and collaborate on common issues, South 
Africa’s lack of a comprehensive maritime transport policy which will give a national direction 
for a number of issues relating to maritime transport and that the country lacks a salvage 
strategy which is meant to protect the lives of people at sea, coupled with a need to review 
national maritime legislations. One respondent argued the said notion stated by the three 
respondents, by stating that South Africa is ready to have such a strategy because adequate 
skills and resources exist in the country. On the other hand, the other three respondents 
remained silent on their viewpoint, one view is that a gap analysis is required in order to 
determine the state of readiness, another view being a need for a transitional period with more 
awareness campaigns being conducted needed. 
 
 Proposed system of governing national maritime security 
 
The system of governance seemed to be in the center of the discussion. The researcher closed 
off the discussion by establishing the views of participants on the issue governance of the 
proposed strategy. The said discussion was probed in order to get the solution to current 
challenges under the South African maritime security environment. The participants were 
asked a question of “how national maritime security should be governed?” In response, 
participants seem to have different views and understandings of how maritime security should 
be governed. Below are some of the recommendations listed in point form.  
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First point: Governance of maritime security should be located within the National Planning 
Commission. This view point was based on the notion that only the President had the power to 
pull role-players together; 
 
Second point:  South Africa was not ready to move towards the development of a 
comprehensive maritime strategy due to the extent of fragmentation and that the current 
maritime arrangement was sufficient until such time that an in-depth understanding and 
analysis of the maritime environment was understood. It was suggested that only then should 
a move towards development of the strategy be made; 
 
Third point: National maritime security formed part of the national security strategy. 
However, it was not purely a naval preserve and therefore it should be located within the correct 
Ministry. The Department of Transport was a suitable ministry to lead national maritime 
security because the maritime environment was located where the Department had the civilian 
oversight; 
 
Fourth point: The leading role of the national maritime security should be allocated to any 
one of the implanting agencies, that Cabinet should give direction on which agency should be 
a lead agency; and  
 
Fifth point: This view suggests that the Department of Transport and the South African 
National Defense Force should be allocated the leading role to ensure that national security 
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The aim of this qualitative research was to evaluate whether South Africa required a national 
maritime security strategy. The study evaluated the current maritime security setup and 
assessed the views, thoughts, ideas and opinions of stakeholders on how South Africa’s 
maritime security strategy could be constructed. The research interpreted the current maritime 
security arrangement and constructed the meaning of the situation in order to provide an answer 
to the research question as contained in this research report. The applied method of research 
looked into assumptions made about the phenomenon and its fundamental aspect of reality. 
 
Chapter five of this report provides an analyses of information collected through the primary 
and secondary data collection processes. The identified respondents provided valuable 
information and generated views, thoughts, ideas and opinions about the phenomenon. The 
data presented identified challenges pertaining to current South African maritime security 
situation, and further generated recommendations to the study on how maritime security should 
be governed. Based on the data collected by this study, this research report concludes by stating 
below the findings, analyses and observations.  
 
CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE   
 
 South Africa became signatory to the IMO in 1995. By becoming a member of the IMO 
South Africa became obligated to cooperate on matters involving governance of the 
maritime domain in order to ensure the protection of maritime domain against any 
national, regional, continental and international threats. The obligation also compelled 
South Africa to develop a comprehensive national maritime security strategy. How such 
a strategy should be developed remains a national government responsibility.  
 
 The research attempted to define maritime security as a concept. Literature revealed 
that there was no single definition suitable for all nations. This argument was confirmed 
by most respondents during the interview. The researcher further observed that 
maritime security stakeholders lacked clarity on distinguishing between protection of 
South African sovereignty and protection of commercial activities affiliated within 
maritime domain;      
 
 The respondents acknowledged that South Africa did not have a comprehensive 
national maritime security strategy and agreed that such as strategy was required. They 
also acknowledged that all current maritime security stakeholders had a major role to 
play in the maritime domain;  
 
 The relationship between these stakeholders could be described as fragmented. This 
suggests that these stakeholders worked in isolation. The fragmentation was blamed on 
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the national governance as mandated by the South Africa Constitution which delegated 
individual roles to each department;   
 However, Chapter 3 of the South African Constitution supports stakeholder 
cooperation.  Chapter 3 of the South African Constitution states that “all spheres of 
government must cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by (i) 
fostering friendly relations, (ii) assisting and supporting one another, (iii) informing one 
another of, and consulting with one another on, matters of common interest, (iv) co-
ordination of their action and legislation with one another, (v) adhering to agreed 
procedures; and (vi) avoiding legal procedures against one another” (The Constitution, 
1994). However, the Chapter referred to cooperation but did not refer to who took 
control and command when law enforcement and civilian departments met in such 
cooperative engagements. Such a state of affairs remained confusing amongst maritime 
security stakeholders.  
 
 The researcher observed the fragmentation identified by this study from the participants 
themselves. When engaged by the researcher during the interview sessions, most 
participates felt very strongly around their own area of focus when it came to maritime 
security. Not much was mentioned on how the working relations was managed or 
coordinated, participants elaborated more on what their individual departments were 
mandated to do not how they interacted with other departments.     
 
 The study has identified that South Africa had relevant structures in place to support 
maritime security nationally and operationally. The country had national legislations, 
relevant national departments, resources and international framework that supported 
maritime security nationally. 
 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
The research concludes by acknowledging that there were a number of activities currently 
taking place in the country as far as national maritime was concerned. More specifically the 
development of the draft Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy (CMTP) which was 
approved by cabinet for public consultation in March 2017. The development of a Border 
Management Authority (BMA), which was undergoing further discussions and reviews, the 
Defence Review, Operation Phakisa which touched on the acceleration of economic 
development in the maritime environment and other initiatives not covered by this research.  
 
The research further observed that these initiatives reflected further fragmentation on the 
strategic level. The department of transport was also developing a policy. The process involved 
all relevant stakeholders for contribution and direction. Operation Phakisa was delegated to the 
Department of Environmental Affairs to drive the process in which each role player was still 
mandated to deliver as per their national mandate. The Defence Review on the other hand had 
all its national security defence strategy reflected in the said document. However, none of these 
processes recommended or documented a national directive which reflected a single station for 
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control and command, where accountability and reporting was centralised. It is with these 
reasons that the research as a first point recommends that:     
 
First Point: South Africa should have a codified national security policy which reflected 
modules representing different areas of national security. National maritime security should 
reflect as a module within the said national policy which should aim the system of governance 
on national security centrally in order to ensure a clear direction on the role and responsibilities 
of the said departments.  
 
Second Point: Emanating from the said national policy (as discussed above), South Africa 
should develop a collaborative national maritime security strategy which should take 
cognisance of the national policy framework. Such a framework would reflect the political 
stand point, national economic development priorities, and regional, continental and 
international policy frameworks.  
 
The national maritime security strategy will benefit South Africa in the following areas:  
 
a. The development of the blue economy: A national maritime security strategy will 
provide solutions and guidelines for coordinating issues on ocean governance between 
socio-economic aspirations and environmental integrity in support of the government’s 
perception that South African waters have the potential to add on the country’s 
economic growth (Operation Phakisa launched by the President during 2014); 
 
b. Application of effective system of governance: The strategy will consolidate issues 
contained in the national development plan and national security priorities to give a 
better view of South Africa’s national interest.  
 
PROPOSED FURTHER RESEARCH TOPICS  
 
The main purpose of the research was to evaluate the extent to which South Africa required a 
national maritime security strategy, and how such a strategy should be constructed. The study 
attempted to understand the current maritime security arrangements in terms of the roles and 
responsibilities of maritime security stakeholders and its challenges. The research recommends 
that South Africa should develop a national maritime security strategy. In that regard, the 
research also acknowledges that there are other areas that need further research of the 
phenomenon. The research recommend further research work to be conducted on the following:  
 
a. Evaluating basics of a national maritime security strategy   
 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether South Africa required a national maritime 
security strategy. The presented findings of this research supports the need for a national 
maritime security strategy. In order to gain more insides on what the said strategy will entail, 
further research to discussion the substance of the said strategy is required.  
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b. A pre-drafting process   
 
In order for the strategy to be developed, the research recommends a pre-drafting process to 
take place. This recommendation is based on a paper produced by the Africa Centre for 
Strategic Studies (2016), which indicated that there were three assessments that should occur 
before a national maritime security strategy was drafted. These are the national self-assessment, 
the maritime domain assessment and national maritime security threats assessment. The 
purpose of these assessments would be to determine the pillars under which the strategy would 
operate under, such as governance, economic, environment, legal, information and military 
(2016).  
 
c. Implementation of the strategy  
    
The pre-drafting process would produce results for drafting the actual strategy, however further 
research must be conducted on how the strategy would be implemented. A research looking 
deeper into the state of the fragmentation and areas that might hinder on the implementation, 
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This interview questionnaire forms part of a research work which intends to evaluate whether 
South Africa require a need for a national maritime security strategy. The research is conducted 
as part of the study in Management in the field of security with the University of 
Witwatersrand. The data collected during this study will solely be utilized for university data 
collection purpose. The study will remain within the South African maritime security 
arrangement. All questions asked are in reference to the South African maritime security 
environment. 
 
You have been selected in your capacity as an employee and subject expert on the topic of 
research together with other identified maritime security stakeholders. Your identity would be 
kept confidential in the research report. You are requested to answer and discuss the questions 
raised only in terms of your experience. I am requesting to have your permission to record and 
make detailed notes of our discussions (applicable of face-to-fate interview).  
 
PART ONE  
 
Name and Surname 
 
Job title:   
Organisation:   
Scope of work:   
 
PART TWO   
 
2.1. Warmup Question  
 
2.1.1 How long have you worked in your current position? 
2.1.2 Does your job description including national maritime security issues? 
2.1.3 Does maritime security form part of your departmental mandate?   
2.1.4 If YES, provide the legislative mandate. 
 
PART THREE  
 
3.1 What is the meaning of national maritime security strategy conceptual 
framework? 
  
3.1.1 In your own view what constitute national security?  
3.1.2 In your own view what constitute maritime security?  
3.1.3 In your own view what is maritime strategy?    
3.1.4 In your own view what is national maritime security strategy?  
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3.2 Evaluating the current South African maritime security arrangement  
 
3.2.1 At national level, which department/s or ministries have a national responsibility for 
maritime security? 
3.2.2 At operational level, who are the stakeholders of maritime security?  
3.2.3 Are the said maritime security stakeholders governed by a written protocol or 
legislation for cooperation on operations? 
3.2.4 Is the current arrangement effective? What are the strategic challenges?    
3.2.5 Does it require improvement? What do you think need to happen? (Elaborate)  
 
3.3 Evaluating a need for a national maritime security strategy in South Africa 
 
3.3.1 Do you think South Africa require a national maritime security strategy? Elaborate  
3.3.2 How will South Africa benefit from having a national maritime security strategy? 
3.3.3 Does the South African government have appropriate skills and resources to put 
together a comprehensive national maritime security strategy? Elaborate  
3.3.4 How should the strategy be structure? Explain areas of importance that should be 
contained in the strategy  
3.3.5 Which stakeholders should form part of the strategy? 
3.3.6 What should be their responsibilities?  
3.3.7 Should the strategy constitute state entities only or incorporate private maritime 
industry? Elaborate  
3.3.8 Do you think South Africa is ready to have a national maritime security strategy? 
3.3.9 Is there a national maritime security strategy you know about/ have seen it? 
3.3.10 What lesson can South Africa copy from that particular strategy? 
 
3.4 Governance of the national maritime security strategy  
 
3.4.1 State how should the national maritime security strategy be governed?  
3.4.2 At what level of governance should the strategy be governed, ministerial or 
parliament? Elaborate  
3.4.3 Which department should be the custodian of the strategy?  
3.4.4 State why is the said department suitable to be the custodian of the strategy? 
3.4.5 Under which legal framework should the strategy be governed?  
3.4.6 What existing measures can be incorporated to the strategy? 
3.4.7 How will the establishment of the strategy benefit South Africa? 
 
 
 
 
